A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ching, S; Serizawa, S
署名单位：
Shiga University of Medical Science; University of Osaka
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2337
发表日期：
1998
页码：
157-166
关键词：
摘要：
In a recent paper, Sprumont (1991, Econometrica 59, 509-519) showed that the uniform rule (Benassy, 1982, The Economics of Market Disequilibrium, Academic Press, 1982) is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity, and efficiency on the single-peaked domain (Black, 1948, J. Polit. Econ. 56, 23-34). This result motivates us to investigate whether there is a larger domain on which there exists a nontrivial strategy-proof rule. We want such a domain to be as large as possible. We show that the single-plateaued domain (Moulin, 1984, Sec. Choice Welfare 1, 127-147) is the unique maximal domain for strategy-proofness, symmetry, and efficiency. Thus, we conclude that the assumption of single-peakedness essentially cannot be weakened if one insists on strategy-proofness, together with the other two basic requirements. (C) 1998 Academic Press.