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作者：Jordan, JS; Xu, DB
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：Models of the behavior of the firm under uncertainty typically assume that the joint probability distribution over all random variables is common knowledge, and only the realized values of some variables are observed differentially. The main result of this paper shows that if the knowledge of the relevant probabilities is initially decentralized, then expected-profit maximizing decisions can require unbounded communication, as measured by the minimal message space dimension. The result is obta...
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作者：Bergin, J; Duggan, J
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：The goal of non-cooperative foundations is to provide credible non-cooperative models of negotiation and coalition formation whose equilibrium outcomes agree with a given cooperative solution. Here we argue that this goal is best achieved by explicitly modeling the physical environment and individual preferences, and by constructing game forms independent of preferences to implement the cooperative solution. We propose a general model of the physical environment; we characterize the coalitiona...
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作者：Barucci, E; Bischi, GI; Gardini, L
作者单位：University of Pisa; University of Urbino
摘要：We study forward-looking economic models assuming that agents take one step ahead expectations looking back k time periods. We show that the dynamics of the economy with such an expectation Function are characterized by the coexistence of perfect foresight and nonperfect foresight cycles. The stability of all these periodic solutions under bounded rationality is related to the stability of the perfect foresight cycles. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, D83, D84; E31, ...
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作者：Yilankaya, O
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：It is shown with an example that, in bilateral trade problems with two-sided incomplete information. some seller types may obtain higher expected payoffs in mechanisms other than the one where they make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, contrary to popular belief. It. one looks at the mechanism selection problem of the (informed) seller, then the optimality of a take-it-or-leave-it offer for the seller is restored. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, D82. (C) 1999 Acade...
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作者：Cabrales, A
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：This paper studies the equilibrating process of several implementation mechanisms using naive adaptive dynamics. We show that the dynamics converge and are stable, for the canonical mechanism of implementation in Nash equilibrium. In this way we cast some doubt on the criticism of complexity commonly used against this mechanism. For a mechanism that implements using the iterated deletion of dominated strategies, the dynamics converge but are less stable. Journal of Economic Literature Classifi...
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作者：Duggan, J
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：A general theorem on extending binary relations to linear (or strict linear) orders is proved. The well-known result that every partial order can be written as the intersection of linear orders in which it is embedded is obtained as a special case, as are several other extension theorems of this type. Using duality arguments, a number of results on the composition of binary relations are proved. For example, a complete, negatively transitive relation is the union of all linear orders embedded ...
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作者：Askenazy, P; Le Van, C
摘要：In this paper we present an optimal growth model with convex-concave technology for an open developing country. The latter may choose to produce consumption goods by borrowing on capital markets or to import consumption goods by investing its saving on capital markets. We prove there exist two nontrivial steady states. An optimal path converges either to 0 or to the high steady state, that depends on the levels of the initial debt and/or of the debt constraint. We also prove there exists a pov...
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作者：Stamland, T
作者单位：University of Wyoming
摘要：This paper shows that a signaling game has separating equilibria if and only if a monotonicity condition holds. This condition requires that, once the sender's types have been ordered according to the single-crossing condition, higher types elicit higher valuations. When this condition fails there may be many D1 outcomes, and the D1 criterion no longer guarantees Pareto dominance. For signaling games that violate this monotonicity condition, we select an equilibrium that conveys as much inform...
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作者：Einy, E; Moreno, D; Shitovitz, B
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Haifa
摘要：We study the asymptotic nucleolus of differentiable monopolistic market games in continuum economies with a finite number of traders' types, and show that, under appropriate assumptions, it is the center of symmetry of the subset of the core in which all the monopolists receive the same payoff: Thus, the nucleolus discriminates the traders in the atomless sector, whereas the competitive equilibrium does not. Moreover, if there is a single syndicated atom and a finite number of atomless sectors...
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作者：Abdulkadiroglu, A; Sönmez, T
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Koc University
摘要：In many real-life applications of house allocation problems, whenever an existing tenant wants to move, he needs to give up his current house before getting another one. This practice discourages existing tenants from such attempts and results in loss of potentially large gains from trade. Motivated by this observation, we propose a simple mechanism that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof. Our approach is constructive and we provide two algorithms, each of which can...
