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作者：Caputo, MR
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：The formal relationship between Silberberg's (J. Econ. Theory 7 (1974), 159-172) primal-dual method of comparative statics and Hatta's (Rev. Econ. Stud. 17 (1980), 957-997) gain method of comparative statics is established. It is proven that the primal-dual method generates all the comparative statics results derivable by the gain method, but not the converse. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C60, C61. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
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作者：Moulin, H
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：A commodity is divided among agents with single-peaked preferences. The commodity is either infinitely divisible or comes in indivisible units. A rationing method elicits individual peaks (demands); if the commodity is overdemanded (resp. underdemanded), no agent receives more (resp. less) than his peak. A fixed-path rationing method allocates an overdemanded good along a path independent of individual demands, except that an agent receives exactly his demand if it is below the path-generated ...
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作者：Jehiel, P; Moldovanu, B; Stacchetti, E
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Mannheim; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：In an auction with externalities, a buyer's type is multidimensional and specifies the payoff he would get for each of the Nf I possible outcomes: the seller keeps the object or buyer i (i = I,..., N) gets the object. We provide a characterization of multidimensional incentive compatible mechanisms similar to that For one-dimensional mechanisms. Although reservation utilities are endogenous and type-dependent, the participation constraint is binding for only one critical type. A main difficult...
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作者：Epstein, LG; Peters, M
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Rochester
摘要：In modelling competition among mechanism designers, it is necessary to specify the set of feasible mechanisms. These specifications are often borrowed from the optimal mechanism design literature and exclude mechanisms that are natural in a competitive environment, for example, mechanisms that depend on the mechanisms chosen by competitors. This paper constructs a set of mechanisms that is universal in that any specific model of the feasible set can be embedded in it. An equilibrium for a spec...
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作者：Chakrabarti, SK
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis
摘要：We show that Markov perfect equilibrium exists for stochastic games which have transition probabilities that are Markovian and product measurable in past period's realisation of the states of nature and actions, and. norm continuous in past period's actions. The transition probabilities are assumed to be absolutely continuous with respect to some measure v(t) every period. We then show that if the stochastic game is stationary and the measure: v is nonatomic, then there exists a semi-Markov eq...
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作者：Chattopadhyay, S; Gottardi, P
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Yale University
摘要：For a general class of pure exchange OLG economies under uncertainty, we provide a complete characterization of the efficiency properties of competitive equilibria when markers are only sequentially complete and the criterion of efficiency is conditional Pareto optimality. We also consider a particular case in which markets fail to be even sequentially complete and provide a characterization when the criterion of efficiency is weakened to ex post Pareto optimality. Journal of Economic Literatu...
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作者：Neeman, Z; Orosel, GO
作者单位：Boston University; University of Vienna
摘要：We present a model of social learning in an environment with common values where informational cascades and herding arise in combination with the winner's curse. A seller of an object sequentially obtains bids from potential buyers. We characterize three classes of equilibria that differ widely in their information aggregation properties and in the size of the rent the seller captures from the buyers. We compare the procedure of sequentially soliciting bids from the buyers to conducting an Eng...
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作者：Armstrong, M
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：This paper presents an analysis of optimal regulation of a firm that has private information about both its cost and demand functions. An earlier paper on the same topic, Lewis and Sappington (Rand J. Econ. 19 (1998), 438-457), is reviewed, a difficulty with their analysis is discussed, and an alternative formulation of their model is proposed. Two broad classes of problem are considered: (i) the case where social and private incentives are roughly aligned, which implies optimal prices are (we...
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作者：Marinacci, M
作者单位：University of Bologna
摘要：In this paper we prove several limit laws for non-additive probabilities. In particular, we prove that, under a multiplicative notion of independence and a regularity condition, if the elements of a sequence {X-k}(k greater than or equal to 1) are i.i.d. random variables relative to a totally monotone and continuous capacity v, then v({integral X-1 dv less than or equal to lim inf(n) 1/n (k=1)Sigma(n) X-k less than or equal to lim sup(n) 1/n (k=1)Sigma(n) X-k less than or equal to - integral -...
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作者：Balinski, M; Sönmez, T
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：A new class of matching problems that models centralized college admissions via standardized tests is presented. The allocation mechanism that is used in real-life applications of this problem in Turkey is analyzed. It is shown that this mechanism, multi-category serial dictatorship, has a number of serious deficiencies, most notably inefficiency, vulnerability to manipulation, and the potential of penalizing students for improved test scores. Exploiting the relation between this class of prob...
