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作者：Bag, PK; Winter, E
作者单位：University of London; Birkbeck University London; Washington University (WUSTL); Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：For excludable public goods, we propose simple mechanisms to implement a (core) stable and efficient production and cost-sharing outcome: consumers are asked to announce sequentially their minimal requested level of public good and a subscription towards its production. In one mechanism the subscriptions depend on the order of moves. In a second mechanism, the subscriptions are order-independent and thus symmetric. The equilibrium outcomes induced by our mechanisms are immune to strategic devi...
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作者：Arrow, KJ; Hahn, F
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Siena
摘要：A sequence economy is an economy with trade at every date and state. It is inessential if its equilibria coincide with those of the corresponding Arrow-Debreu economy. We examine some of the conditions for essentiality. (1) If there are transaction costs, then even if all states of nature are spanned by the securities, the economy is generically essential. (2) In the absence of transaction costs, we show by examples that spanning is neither necessary nor sufficient for inessentiality, the form...
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作者：Cozzi, G
作者单位：Cornell University; Sapienza University Rome
摘要：If R&D produces nonrival inputs then firms have an incentive to cooperate, but free riding can make cooperation difficult. This paper builds a simple endogenous growth model allowing cooperative behavior among firms in their R&D game. growth Industry's first best cooperative investment is enforceable as an equilibrium only if technology is above a threshold level. This model allows for switching equilibria able to sustain slower growth in poorer countries. The model also admits sunspot equilib...
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作者：Gale, D; Rosenthal, RW
作者单位：New York University; Boston University
摘要：Do boundedly rational agents repeatedly playing a symmetric game with a unique symmetric equilibrium learn over time to play it? In this paper we model the dynamic interaction of two types of such agents, experimenters and imitators, whose behavior is characterized by simple rules of thumb. We iind that the stochastic process describing their play is stable in the large: it converges globally and with probability one to st compact neighborhood of the equilibrium. However, its local behavior ne...
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作者：Boucekkine, R; del Río, F; Licandro, O
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：In this paper, we present a particular case of the creative destruction model of Caballero and Hammour, (Quart. J. Econ. 111 (1996), 805-851) in which both exogenous and endogenous fluctuation sources are present. We show that job creation Follows a delayed differential equation with periodic coefficients. The delay is equal to the optimal age of capital goods. The period of the coefficients is equal to the period of an exogenous profitability cycle. We mathematically show that job creation is...
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作者：Saari, DG
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：A theory is developed to explain all possible three-alternative (single-profile) pairwise and positional voting outcomes. This includes all preference aggregation paradoxes, cycles, conflict between the Borda and Condorcet winners, differences among positional outcomes (e.g., the plurality and antiplurality methods), and differences among procedures using these outcomes (e.g., runoffs, Kemeny's rule, and Copeland's method). It is shown how to identify, interpret, and construct all profiles sup...
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作者：Mandler, M
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Pareto improvements that require no information about individual characteristics are analyzed. Initially, equilibrium must be production inefficient. After the policy change, consumer prices differ From producer prices, but allocations, although second-best, are Pareto superior and production efficient. Policy implementation is modeled as a dynamical system that governs aggregate consumer wealth, producer prices, and production levels. With knowledge of the maximum feasible level of consumer w...
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作者：Roberts, K
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：Conditions that exhaust the implications of rationality (homogeneity, symmetry, definiteness) are well known, but these apply under a single set of constraints. If a situation can be compared with another situation where extra constraints are imposed, there are stronger implications. One example is the (local) LeChatelier principle. However, a global LeChatelier principle does not always hold, and this paper shows that it cannot always hold in any nondegenerate problem. Despite this, a global ...
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作者：Thiele, H; Wambach, A
作者单位：University of Munich; University of Munich
摘要：This paper addresses the question of how the principal's surplus and agency costs depend on the agent's wealth. Our main results are that if the agent has an additively separable utility function in income and effort and his degree of absolute prudence is smaller than three times the agent's degree of absolute risk aversion, then the principal's expected pay-off is smaller the richer the agent. For general utility functions, this result also holds if the first order approach is applicable and ...
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作者：Gatti, JRJ
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：This paper analyses the optimal search strategy for consumers who wish to purchase several different commodities, possibly from several different firms, but are not perfectly informed about the prices charged by each firm for every commodity. It is shown that in general the optimal search strategy will nor possess the Reservation Property, the multi-commodity equivalent of a Reservation Price. Necessary and sufficient conditions are identified for the optimal search strategy to possess the Res...
