A note on the seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Yilankaya, O
署名单位：
Northwestern University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2532
发表日期：
1999
页码：
267-271
关键词：
摘要：
It is shown with an example that, in bilateral trade problems with two-sided incomplete information. some seller types may obtain higher expected payoffs in mechanisms other than the one where they make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, contrary to popular belief. It. one looks at the mechanism selection problem of the (informed) seller, then the optimality of a take-it-or-leave-it offer for the seller is restored. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, D82. (C) 1999 Academic Press.