-
作者：Schummer, J
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We consider allocation rules that choose outcomes and transfers, based on agents' reported valuations of the outcomes. A bribing situation exists when one agent could pay another to misreport his valuations, resulting in a net gain to both. A bribe-proof rule eliminates such opportunities. We show that under a bribe-proof rule, each agent's payoff is a continuous function of other agents' reported valuations. Furthermore, on connected domains, if the set of outcomes is finite or the domain is ...
-
作者：Yates, AJ
作者单位：Tulane University
摘要：Using a stylized model of the used car market, we extend the formal theory, of the Austrian market process in three directions. First, we incorporate the knowledge problem and entrepreneurial alertness for the discovery of previously unknown information. Second, we allow for the possibility that entrepreneurs may make mistakes. Third, we describe the effect of entrepreneurial behavior on dis-equilibrium market adjustment. We give conditions under which an equilibrium exists for an Austrian mar...
-
作者：Dumas, B; Uppal, R; Wang, T
作者单位：INSEAD Business School; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Pennsylvania; University of British Columbia
摘要：In this article, our objective is to determine efficient allocations in economies with multiple agents having recursive, non-time-additive utility functions. Our main result is to show that in a multi-agent economy, the problem of determining efficient allocations can be characterized in terms of a single value function (that of a social planner), rather than multiple functions (one for each investor), as has been proposed thus far (D. Duffie et al., 1994, J. Math. Econ. 23, 133-146). We then ...
-
作者：Che, YK; Gale, I
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Georgetown University
摘要：This paper finds an optimal mechanism for selling a good to a buyer who may be budget-constrained. We consider a seller with one unit of a good facing a buyer with ic quasilinear utility function. If the buyer does not face a binding budget constraint, textbook monopoly pricing is optimal. By contrast, the possibility of a binding budget constraint can make it optimal for the seller to use nonlinear pricing, to commit to a declining price sequence, to require the buyer to disclose his budget. ...
-
作者：Gul, F; Stacchetti, E
作者单位：Princeton University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We study economies with indivisibilities that satisfy the gross substitutes (GS) condition. The simplest example of GS preferences are unit demand preferences. We prove that the set of GS preferences is the largest set containing unit demand preferences for which the existence of Walrasian equilibrium is guaranteed. We show that if a GS economy is replicated sufficiently many times, the equilibrium payment of any agent in the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is equal to the value of the allocat...
-
作者：Hofbauer, J; Sorger, G
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of Vienna
摘要：The equilibrium selection approach of Matsui and Matsuyama (J. Econ. Theory 65 (1995), 415-434) which is based on rational players who maximize their discounted future payoff, is analyzed for symmetric two-player games with a potential function. It is shown that the maximizer of the potential function is the unique state that is absorbing and globally accessible for small discount rates. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
-
作者：Saijo, T; Yamato, T
作者单位：University of Osaka; Japan Science & Technology Agency (JST); Tokyo Metropolitan University
摘要：In the previous mechanism design on public goods, it was implicitly assumed that every agent must participate in the mechanism that the designer provides. This approach neglects non-excludability of public goods. We explicitly incorporate non-excludability and examine a two-stage game with voluntary participation: In the first stage, each agent simultaneously decides whether she participates ill the mechanism or not, and in the second stage, knowing the other agents' participation decisions, t...
-
作者：Battigalli, P; Siniscalchi, M
作者单位：Princeton University; European University Institute
摘要：The epistemic analysis of solution concepts for dynamic games involves statements about the players' beliefs conditional upon different histories of play, their conditional beliefs about each other's conditional beliefs, etc. To represent such statements, we construct a space of infinite (coherent) hierarchies of conditional probability systems, defined with respect to ii fixed collection of. relevant hypotheses concerning an external state (e.g., the strategy profile being played.) As an appl...
-
作者：Jackson, MO; Kalai, E
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Northwestern University
摘要：A folk theorem of game theory illustrates that strategic use of reputation can drastically alter the equilibrium play of an isolated group of n-players engaged in a finitely repeated game. We show that this folk theorem may fail in social settings where many groups of n-players play the game sequentially. The ability to strategically use reputation dies out over time due to players' opportunity to observe the play of earlier groups. This phenomenon is demonstrated in a model of Bayesian recurr...
-
作者：Sáez-Martí, M; Weibull, JW
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
摘要：In the models of Young (1993, Econometrica 61, 57-84; 1993, J. Econ. Theory 59, 145-168), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent: history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational players might conceivably also do. We investigate this possibility in the context of Young's (J. Econ. Theory 59, 145-168) bargaining model. It t...
