Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Cabrales, A
署名单位：
Pompeu Fabra University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2530
发表日期：
1999
页码：
159-184
关键词：
摘要：
This paper studies the equilibrating process of several implementation mechanisms using naive adaptive dynamics. We show that the dynamics converge and are stable, for the canonical mechanism of implementation in Nash equilibrium. In this way we cast some doubt on the criticism of complexity commonly used against this mechanism. For a mechanism that implements using the iterated deletion of dominated strategies, the dynamics converge but are less stable. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D70; D78. (C) 1999 Academic Press.