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作者：Bandyopadhyay, T; Dasgupta, I; Pattanaik, PK
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; Deakin University
摘要：This paper extends the deterministic revealed preference theory of consumers' behavior to permit stochastic choices. In this extended framework, we introduce a restriction on stochastic choices that constitutes a stochastic counterpart of the weak axiom of revealed preference. This restriction allows us to derive stochastic versions of nonpositivity of the own substitution effect and the demand theorem. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Number Number: D11. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
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作者：Spagnolo, G
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; University of Cambridge
摘要：Following Bernheim and Whinston (1990), this paper addresses the effects of multimarket contact on firms' ability to collude. Real world imperfections tend to make firms' objective function strictly concave and market supergames interdependent: firms' payoffs in each market depend on how they are doing in others. Then, multimarket contact always facilitates collusion. It may even make collusion sustainable in all markets when otherwise it would not be sustainable in any. The effects of conglom...
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作者：Francois, P; Shi, SY
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; Tilburg University
摘要：This paper establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of stationary cycles in an economy comprising independent investing firms. The economy is not subject to aggregate uncertainty, investors have no direct complementarities, and all agents act independently. The cycle arises due to general equilibrium contemporanrous complementarities between investors devoting resources to innovation which yields temporary profits. With numerical examples we show that there art: multip...
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作者：Strausz, R
作者单位：Free University of Berlin
摘要：We consider sequential partnerships in which agents obtain non-verifiable information about the actions taken by previous agents. For such partnerships a budget-balanced sharing rule exists that induces efficient production. The sharing rule has many desirable features: (1) it uniquely implements efficient production, (2) it does not rely on message games, (3) it does not rely on unlimited liability, and (4) it is robust to renegotiation. The rule is furthermore simple; intuitive; and robust t...
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作者：Blackorby, C; Bossert, W; Donaldson, D
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Aix-Marseille Universite; University of Nottingham; University of British Columbia
摘要：This note investigates the extension of Roberts' price-independent welfare prescriptions to alternatives in which population size and composition can vary. We show that ethically unsatisfactory orderings result. Suppose that a single person is to be added to a population that is unaffected in utility terms. Either all such additions must be regarded as bad or some expansions in which the added person's life is not worth living must be ranked as social improvements. Journal of Economic Literatu...
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作者：Chen, MA; Maskin, ES
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：The automatic bargaining theory of J. Nash (1950. Econometrica 18. 155-162) presumes that only status quo utilities and the shape of the utility possibilities set are relevant to the bargaining outcome. Here we consider a class of economic problems for which bargaining solutions may depend on more than just utility information. (A fifty-fifty split of a single good between two bargainers is one example of such a solution.) It is shown that the requirements of Pareto efficiency), weak symmetry,...
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作者：Schönhofer, M
作者单位：University of Bielefeld
摘要：Chaotic temporary equilibrium trajectories under least squares learning are shown to exist in a standard version of the overlapping generations model. Theses trajectories show forecast errors that never vanish. Thus we do not find convergence to an equilibrium, in which agents have perfect foresight. Complex trajectories can even be found in the case of savings functions, which are monotonically decreasing in the expected gross rate of inflation. In this case no cyclical or chaotic trajectorie...
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作者：Deb, R; Razzolini, L
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; University of Mississippi
摘要：We study the problem of strategy-proof mechanism design for indivisible and excludable public goods. Applying Vickrey's theory of auctions we associate a class of strategy-proof mechanisms to two types of procedures, the English Auction-Like Mechanism (EALM) and the Sealed Bid Auction-Like Mechanism (SBALM). We show that these two Auction-Like Mechanisms lead to identical outcomes. We justify the use of these mechanisms as compared to other strategy-proof mechanisms by arguing that outcomes of...
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作者：van Hees, M
作者单位：University of Groningen
摘要：Drawing on the game-theoretic analysis of rights, this paper re-examines the relation between liberal principles of decision making, on the one hand, and demands for stability and efficiency, on the other. Two possibility results are obtained. First, rights assignments in which individuals enjoy maximal freedom are shown to ensure the stability and efficiency of the decision process: there is always at least one Nash equilibrium with a Pareto-optimal outcome. Second, it is shown that a univers...
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作者：Brusco, S; Jackson, MO
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study the optimal design of the rules of trade in a two-period market given that agents arrive at different times and may only trade with agents present contemporaneously. First period agents face a fixed cost of trading across periods. Given the non-convexities associated with the fixed cost, competitive trading rules can result in inefficiencies in such a market and anonymity must be sacrificed to achieve efficiency. Efficient trading rules have a market maker (who is given a monopoly rig...
