An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Bergin, J; Duggan, J
署名单位：
Queens University - Canada; University of Rochester; University of Rochester
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1998.2505
发表日期：
1999
页码：
50-76
关键词：
摘要：
The goal of non-cooperative foundations is to provide credible non-cooperative models of negotiation and coalition formation whose equilibrium outcomes agree with a given cooperative solution. Here we argue that this goal is best achieved by explicitly modeling the physical environment and individual preferences, and by constructing game forms independent of preferences to implement the cooperative solution. We propose a general model of the physical environment; we characterize the coalitional functions arising from environments via alpha- and beta-effectively; and we take up an issue of payoff consistency with special reference to the core. (C) 1999 Academic Press.