-
作者：Yoon, K
摘要：Wt construct a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium in Green and Porter's (1984, Econometrica 52, 87-100) imperfect public information model, which Paretodominates the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D43, D82. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
-
作者：Alós-Ferrer, C
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：Many models postulate a continuum of agents of finitely many types who are repeatedly randomly matched in pairs to perform certain activities (e.g., play a game) which may in turn make their types change. If the random matching process is left unspecified, no law of large numbers holds in this framework, casting doubts on the deterministic approximations which are usually informally invoked. This work shows that there exist random matching processes for a continuum of agents satisfying propert...
-
作者：Rabault, G
摘要：This paper proposes a framework for the decomposition of risk into an aggregate and an idiosyncratic component which sidesteps the difficulties inherent in continuums of random variables, addressed recently in Al Najjar (Econometrica 63 (1995), 1195-1224). It assumes that the population is denumerable and that individuals are indistinguishable ex ante. In that context, a factorization of risk exists. A a-field of aggregate events can be identified, which is such that all aggregate quantities a...
-
作者：Esteban, J; Ray, D
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Boston University
摘要：We develop a behavioral model that links the level and pattern of social conflict to the societywide distribution of individual characteristics. The model can be applied to groups that differ in characteristics such as wealth, ethnicity, religion, and political ideology. We settle questions of existence and uniqueness of conflict equilibrium. Conflict is seen to be closely connected with the bimodality of the underlying distribution of characteristics. However, in general, the conflict-distrib...
-
作者：Marjit, S; Beladi, H
作者单位：University System of Ohio; University of Dayton
摘要：Growth in the import-competing output is usually accompanied by a decline in the volume of imports of the product. This result may change when we consider intermediate goods. We develop a multi-sector general equilibrium model to show that larger local output of an intermediate good may also imply larger imports of the same. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: F1, F11, F13. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
-
作者：Chung, KS
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This note first uses a simple example to show that H. Matsushima's (1991, J. Econ. Theory 54, 198-203) regularity condition, to the contrary of his claim, actually does not imply C. d'Aspremont and L.-A. Gerard-Varet's (1979, J. Public Ei on. 11, 25-45) compatibility condition. It then proves a stronger version of Matsushima's proposition, namely that efficient public decision rules can be truthfully implemented with budget-balancing mechanisms under the, weak regularity condition. (C) 1999 Ac...
-
作者：Cadenillas, A; Zapatero, F
作者单位：University of Alberta; University of Southern California
摘要：We consider a currency with exchange rate dynamics modeled as a geometric Brownian motion. The objective of the Central Bank is to keep this exchange rate as close as possible to a given target, so there is a running cost associated to the difference between the exchange rate and the target. Additionally, there are also fixed and proportional costs associated with each intervention. The objective of this paper is to iind the optimal level of intervention, and the optimal sizes of the intervent...
-
作者：Chwe, MSY
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：I present in Simple two-person auction model in which a seller and a buyer make bids in terms of money; however: the value of a unit of money is uncertain. I show: (1) a monetary revaluation has purely nominal effects if and only if it is common knowledge: (2) if seller and buyer have identical beliefs, making the value of money common knowledge maximizes total gains from trade; (3) if seller and buyer are equally well informed and have identical beliefs, then monetary revaluations have no net...
-
作者：Schroder, M; Skiadas, C
作者单位：Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business; Northwestern University
摘要：We develop the utility gradient (or martingale) approach for computing portfolio and consumption plans that maximize stochastic differential utility (SDU), a continuous-time version of recursive utility due to D. Duffie and L. Epstein (1992, Econometrica 60. 353-394). We characterize the first-order conditions of optimality as a system of forward-backward SDEs, which, in the Markovian case, reduces to a system of PDEs and forward only SDEs that is amenable to numerical computation, Another con...
-
作者：Brusco, S
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：In situations of complete information, when a social choice function can be implemented using an extensive form game. it is always the case that there is an equilibrium which does not go beyond the first stage (that is, an equilibrium with one round of signaling). We show that this is not true in the incomplete information case. We provide: an example in which a social choice function cannot be implemented with an extensive form game if the mechanism has an equilibrium with one round of signal...
