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作者：Sönmez, T
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Koc University
摘要：We study manipulation via pre-arranged matches in the context of centralized two-sided matching markets. We show that the solution that is used to match the hospitals and medical residents in the United States, namely the hospital-optimal stable rule, is manipulable in this way. Unfortunately this is a general problem: We show that there is no solution that is both stable and non-manipulable. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
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作者：Vohra, R
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：We consider an exchange economy in which agents possess private information at the time of engaging in state contingent contracts. While communication of private information is permitted, the true information state is not verifiable. The enforcement of contracts is, therefore, limited by incentive compatibility constraints. We formalize a notion of the core for such an economy. Our analysis can be viewed as an attempt to incorporate incentive compatibility in the coarse core of R. Wilson (1978...
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作者：Dana, RA; Le Van, C; Magnien, F
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：In this paper we first prove an equilibrium existence theorem for finite dimensional economies with unbounded below consumption sets. We only assume that the individually rational utility set is compact and use the demand approach instead of the standard Negishi's approach. We next compare the different concepts of no-arbitrage that have been used in the literature and give conditions ibr equivalence between absence of arbitrage and existence of equilibrium Lastly, we introduce the concept of ...
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作者：Katzman, B
作者单位：University of Miami
摘要：Working within the independent private values paradigm, I examine a sequence of two second price auctions where individual bidders have diminishing marginal valuations. Equilibria are characterized for complete and incomplete informational settings. When information is complete, allocations can be inefficient and price sequences are constant or decreasing. However, when information is incomplete and symmetric, equilibrium behavior produces efficient outcomes and an expectation of increasing pr...
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作者：Agastya, M
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London
摘要：Players adaptively learn how to bargain. A characteristic function describes the available surplus. The underlying bargaining game extends the Nash demand game by allowing subcoalitions to reach an agreement. Players' demands must be multiples of a money unit. We show that stochastically stable allocations (SSA) (i.e., allocations that are most stable to unlikely errors) are a subset of the core. Uniqueness does not obtain even when the money unit becomes arbitrarily small. Nonetheless, every ...
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作者：Friedman, E; Moulin, H
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Duke University
摘要：We study cost sharing methods with variable demands of heterogeneous goods, additive in the cost function and meeting the dummy axiom. We consider four axioms: scale invariance (SI); demand monotonicity (DM); upper bound for homogeneous goods (UBH) placing a natural cap on cost shares when goods are homogeneous; average cost pricing for homogeneous goods (ACPH). The random order values based on stand alone costs are characterized by SI and DM. Serial costsharing, by DM and UB; the Aumann-Shapl...
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作者：Bisin, A; Gottardi, P
作者单位：New York University; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：This paper studies competitive equilibria in economies where agents trade in markets for standardized, non-exclusive financial contracts, under conditions of asymmetric information (both of the moral hazard and the adverse selection type). The problems for the existence of competitive equilibria in this framework are identified, and shown to be essentially the same under different forms of asymmetric information. We then show that a minimal form of non-linearity of prices (a bid-ask spread, re...
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作者：Konishi, H; Le Breton, M; Weber, S
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：In this paper we consider two notions of a coalitional deviation: strict deviation, where each of member of a deviating group is better off, and weak deviation, where at least one member of a deviating group is better off while all other members are at least as well off. We then examine, for the class of common agency games introduced in Bernheim and Whinston (Quart. J. Econ. 101 (1986), 1-31), the structure and properties of two notions of a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, generated by stri...
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作者：Dekel, E; Fudenberg, D; Levine, DK
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. This paper develops a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium in which players use information about opponents' payoffs in forming beliefs about the way that opponents play off of the equilibrium path. We show that this concept is robust to payoff uncertainty. We also discuss its relati...
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作者：Kornish, LJ
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：Y. Balcer and S. A. Lippman (1984, J. Econ. Theory 34, 292-318) develop a model to analyze the buy or wait problem under technological change. They show that this dynamic problem has a threshold solution: if the difference between the best available technology and that currently held exceeds a:certain threshold, then buy. They also claim that the threshold is increasing in the discovery potential. That is, the faster the technology is changing, the higher the threshold. In this note, we point ...
