Journal of Economic Theory

最新文章

• Markets for composite goods AI翻译
  作者：Balasko, Y
  摘要：The usual assumptions about preferences and production technologies are easily justified when they involve elementary goods (differentiated by dates, locations, and states of nature). But it is far less easy to come up with direct justifications when only composite goods are traded. We show that the equilibria defined by the equality of supply and demand of composite goods coincide with the Walrasian equilibria of suitably defined economies whose commodity space is the composite commodity spac...
• A note on the optimal structure of production AI翻译
  作者：Da Rocha, JM; de Frutos, MA
  作者单位：Universidade de Vigo; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
  摘要：We analyze the advantages of centralization and decentralization in industries in which production takes place in several stages and the costs are privately observed by the agents in charge of production. We demonstrate that ''informational diseconomies arise when uncorrelated information is concentrated in the hands of a single agent. These diseconomies arise when the stages of production are different activities with different cost supports. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numb...
• Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information AI翻译
  作者：Krasa, S
  作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Vienna
  摘要：The paper considers an exchange economy with incomplete information in-which agents can retrade goods until all gains From trade are exhausted. Unimprovable allocations are defined to be those allocations from which agents would not wish to deviate either by retrading goods or by revealing further Information. The concept of unimprovability is then used to analyze a lemons market and an adverse selection insurance marker in which agents can renegotiate after information has been revealed. Fina...
• Starting small and renegotiation AI翻译
  作者：Watson, J
  作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
  摘要：This paper develops a model of a long-term partnership with two-sided incomplete information. The partners jointly determine the stakes of their relationship and individually decide whether to cooperate with or betray each other over time. An equilibrium in which the partners start small is studied and shown to be uniquely selected by a strong renegotiation condition. The characterization offers new insights into how relationships change as parties learn about each other and qualitative differ...
• Habit persistence in overlapping generations economies under pure exchange AI翻译
  作者：Lahiri, A; Puhakka, M
  作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Helsinki
  摘要：This paper analyzes the implications of habit persistance preferences for savings and equilibrium dynamics in the contest of an overlapping generations model under pure exchange. We show that habit persistence can convert an economy which otherwise has no role for government currency into an economy where there does exist a role for such currency. Further. the increased saving induced by habit persistence implies that governments are able to float higher levels of deficits in such economies re...
• Forward induction, public randomization, and admissibility AI翻译
  作者：Govindan, S; Robson, AJ
  摘要：Gul and Pearce argue that forward induction has much less power as an equilibrium refinement than is generally supposed. The present comment raises the issue: What does admissibility imply for Gul and Pearce's analysis? In a key example, the precise equilibrium constructed by Gul and Pearce depends on a strategy which is not admissible. Even if ali equilibria are considered, it is not possible to preserve the Gul and Pearce results under admissibility. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
• Dynamic programming with homogeneous functions AI翻译
  作者：Alvarez, F; Stokey, NL
  作者单位：University of Chicago
  摘要：We show that the basic existence, uniqueness, and convergence results of dynamic programming hold when the return function is homogeneous of degree 0 less than or equal to 1 and the constraints are homogeneous of degree one. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
• Evolution with changing mutation rates AI翻译
  作者：Robles, J
  作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
  摘要：This article considers the robustness of long run equilibria when mutation rates are not assumed to be constant over time. Particular attention is paid to the case where mutation rates decline to zero in the limit. It is Found that if behavior is ergodic, then it corresponds to the long run equilibrium for the game. However, conditions for ergodicity become increasingly restrictive as population size increases. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
• Pollution claim settlements under correlated information AI翻译
  作者：Pesendorfer, M
  作者单位：Yale University
  摘要：Agents have to decide whether a polluting plant will be operated or not. Agents' disutility (cost) from pollution is privately known, but correlated across agents. Incentive compatible mechanisms are characterized under the assumption that transfer payments are non-negative. The implementability constraint is similar to the independence case, except that virtual utilities are diminished by a factor due to the correlation of agents' types. As correlation vanishes, the implementability constrain...
• Experimentation and competition AI翻译
  作者：Fishman, A; Rob, R
  作者单位：University of Haifa; University of Pennsylvania
  摘要：This paper examines the effect of competition on firms' efforts to experiment and learn about market demand. Consumers are assumed to know prices only at sellers they have actually visited, but must bear search costs to Find the prices of other sellers. Under these conditions we show that firms' incentives to experiment are diluted by comparison with the monopoly case and that this effect is stronger the smaller the search cost. The learning environment we portray gives rise to several time pa...