Partially informative signaling
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Stamland, T
署名单位：
University of Wyoming
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2563
发表日期：
1999
页码：
148-161
关键词：
摘要：
This paper shows that a signaling game has separating equilibria if and only if a monotonicity condition holds. This condition requires that, once the sender's types have been ordered according to the single-crossing condition, higher types elicit higher valuations. When this condition fails there may be many D1 outcomes, and the D1 criterion no longer guarantees Pareto dominance. For signaling games that violate this monotonicity condition, we select an equilibrium that conveys as much information as is possible. Pareto dominates all other equilibria that are equally informative, and survives the D1 criterion. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82. (C) 1999 Academic Press.