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作者：Hüsseinov, F
作者单位：Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
摘要：This paper presents a market equilibrium existence theorem that generalizes and unifies many well-known results. The importance of the theorem is illustrated by applications to large exchange economics. A further extension of Aumann's Existence theorem is obtained which dispenses with the monotony assumption on preferences. In addition the market equilibrium results of Grandmont and Neuefeind are compared. It is shown that the boundary condition of Grandmont's result is equivalent to some natu...
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作者：Dekel, E; Scotchmer, S
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：A long-standing conjecture is that winner-take-all games such as patent races lead to the survival of risk-takers and the extinction of risk-averters. In many species a winner-lake-ail game determines the males' right to reproduce, and the same argument suggests that males will evolve to he risk-takers. Psychological and sociological evidence buttresses the argument that males are more risk-taking than females. Using an evolutionary model of preference-formation, we investigate to what extent ...
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作者：Wälde, K
作者单位：Dortmund University of Technology; The World Bank
摘要：This paper studies optimal saving and investment behaviour of a household that can either invest in a riskless or a risky saving technology when risk results from a Poisson process. The focus is on behaviour of households in a general equilibrium setup. Poisson processes are introduced since they allow us to understand and model endogenous cycles jointly with long-run growth. It turns out that a very simple, intuitive and tractable characterization of equilibrium is possible. Journal of Econom...
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作者：Chakravorti, B
摘要：This paper is motivated by Rubinstein (1980), who introduces a solution concept for voting games called the stability set which resolves the well-known paradox of voting. We argue here that this resolution is based on a model of farsightedness that has drawbacks: iii the voters are myopic in the sense that they ignore far-sightedness on the part of others and (ii) voters look only one step ahead and do not consider events arbitrarily hr ahead. To address these issues, we propose a model of con...
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作者：Bandyopadhyay, T; Sengupta, K
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
摘要：This paper examines the connection between path independence and transitive rationalization of a choice function in a general domain where a choice function may nor include all possible non-empty subsets of the universal set. Describing a sequential choice procedure, this paper show's that the requirement of path independence of a choice function is equivalent to Richter's Congruence Axiom and thus to its transitive rationalization. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D11. (C...
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作者：Wallner, K
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：This paper analyzes a finite horizon, sequential move pricing duopoly, restricting attention to Markov strategies. The solution yields stationary patterns, independent of initial conditions, where the reaction-functions follow cycles of three periods. The market price never settles down, and is at all times strictly above marginal cost. Long-run average industry profits are approximately 5/6 of the monopoly level. These results demonstrate that neither a long horizon nor non-Markovian strategi...
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作者：Hillier, B; Rougier, J
作者单位：University of Liverpool; Durham University
摘要：This paper develops a simple neo-classical model of the business cycle characterised by multiple equilibria produced by the interaction of the investment and production processes. For the usual symmetric information model the source of the multiple equilibria may be found in non-linearities in the production function. Under asymmetric information another possible source of multiple equilibria is non-linearities in the investment-wealth relationship. Persistence is generated by changes in the s...
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作者：Makowski, L; Ostroy, JM; Segal, U
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：Efficient, anonymous, and continuous mechanisms for exchange environments with a finite number of individuals are dominant strategy incentive compatible if and only if they are perfectly competitive, i.e., each individual is unable to influence prices or anyone's wealth. Equivalently, in such a mechanism each individual creates no externalities for others by her announcement of a type. The characterization applies whether preferences are ordinal or quasilinear, and it also applies to continuum...
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作者：Martimort, D
作者单位：Universite de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour; Universite de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour
摘要：One striking feature of the internal organization of governments is the existence of multiple regulators. This paper explains this organizational choice as coming from the government's limited ability to commit. The separation of powers between two regulators is modeled as a Stackelberg common agency game. With respect to the case of a single regulator, the allocative efficiency and the regulated firm's informational rent are both reduced in the unique equilibrium of this game. However, when r...
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作者：Gretsky, NE; Ostroy, JM; Zame, WR
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper provides a rigorous formalization, in the context of the transferable utility assignment model, of perfect competition as the inability of individuals to (favorably) influence prices. The central tool for the analysis is the social gains function; the central issue is differentiability of the gains function with respect to the population. Seven conditions are shown to be equivalent to perfect competition. Perfect competition and imperfect competition are possible for both finite and...
