The asymptotic nucleolus of large monopolistic market games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Einy, E; Moreno, D; Shitovitz, B
署名单位：
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Haifa
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2575
发表日期：
1999
页码：
186-206
关键词：
摘要：
We study the asymptotic nucleolus of differentiable monopolistic market games in continuum economies with a finite number of traders' types, and show that, under appropriate assumptions, it is the center of symmetry of the subset of the core in which all the monopolists receive the same payoff: Thus, the nucleolus discriminates the traders in the atomless sector, whereas the competitive equilibrium does not. Moreover, if there is a single syndicated atom and a finite number of atomless sectors, the syndicate is treated more favorably under the asymptotic nucleolus than under the Shapley value associated with the pure monopolistic market. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, D40. (C) 1999 Academic Press.