Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Makowski, L; Ostroy, JM; Segal, U
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California Davis; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1998.2494
发表日期：
1999
页码：
169-225
关键词：
摘要：
Efficient, anonymous, and continuous mechanisms for exchange environments with a finite number of individuals are dominant strategy incentive compatible if and only if they are perfectly competitive, i.e., each individual is unable to influence prices or anyone's wealth. Equivalently, in such a mechanism each individual creates no externalities for others by her announcement of a type. The characterization applies whether preferences are ordinal or quasilinear, and it also applies to continuum economies. Perfectly competitive mechanisms are non-generic (although non-vacuous) in finite economies and are generic (but non-universal) in continuum economies. We use these results to provide bridges to related work. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D51, D62. (C) 1999 Academic Press.