On the evolution of attitudes towards risk in winner-take-all games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Dekel, E; Scotchmer, S
署名单位：
Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2537
发表日期：
1999
页码：
125-143
关键词：
摘要：
A long-standing conjecture is that winner-take-all games such as patent races lead to the survival of risk-takers and the extinction of risk-averters. In many species a winner-lake-ail game determines the males' right to reproduce, and the same argument suggests that males will evolve to he risk-takers. Psychological and sociological evidence buttresses the argument that males are more risk-taking than females. Using an evolutionary model of preference-formation, we investigate to what extent evolution leads to risk-taking in winner-take-ail environments. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, D8. (C) 1999 Academic Press.