Far-sightedness and the voting paradox
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Chakravorti, B
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1998.2466
发表日期：
1999
页码：
216-226
关键词：
摘要：
This paper is motivated by Rubinstein (1980), who introduces a solution concept for voting games called the stability set which resolves the well-known paradox of voting. We argue here that this resolution is based on a model of farsightedness that has drawbacks: iii the voters are myopic in the sense that they ignore far-sightedness on the part of others and (ii) voters look only one step ahead and do not consider events arbitrarily hr ahead. To address these issues, we propose a model of consistently far-sighted voting. In contrast to Rubinstein (1980) and others, consistent far-sightedness has virtually no incremental contribution towards ensuring stability in voting games beyond the predictions of the core. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, C70, D72. (C) 1999 Academic Press.