Sequential moves and tacit collusion: Reaction-function cycles in a finite pricing duopoly
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Wallner, K
署名单位：
Stockholm School of Economics
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1998.2484
发表日期：
1999
页码：
251-267
关键词：
摘要：
This paper analyzes a finite horizon, sequential move pricing duopoly, restricting attention to Markov strategies. The solution yields stationary patterns, independent of initial conditions, where the reaction-functions follow cycles of three periods. The market price never settles down, and is at all times strictly above marginal cost. Long-run average industry profits are approximately 5/6 of the monopoly level. These results demonstrate that neither a long horizon nor non-Markovian strategies are required for persistent profits in dynamic price-competition games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, D43, L13 (C) 1999 Academic Press.