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作者：Häckner, J
作者单位：Stockholm University
摘要：In this note we show that the results developed in N. Singh and X. Vives (1984, Rand J. Econ, 15, 546-554) are sensitive to the duopoly assumption. If there are more than two firms, prices may be higher under price competition than under quantity competition. This will be the case if quality differences are large and goods are complements. If goods are substitutes, high-quality firms may earn higher profits under price competition than under quantity competition. Hence, it is not evident which...
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作者：Bennett, RL; Farmer, REA
作者单位：Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); European University Institute
摘要：J. Benhabib and R. E. A. Farmer (1904, J. Econ Theory 63, 19-41) showed that a single sector growth model in the presence of increasing returns-to-scale may display an indeterminate equilibrium if the demand and supply curves cross with the wrong slopes. We generalize their result to a model with preferences that are non-separable in consumption and leisure. We provide a simple analog of the Benhabib Farmer condition that works in the non-separable case. Our condition is easy to check in pract...
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作者：Koçkesen, L; Ok, EA; Sethi, R
作者单位：Columbia University; New York University; Columbia University
摘要：We study certain classes of supermodular and submodular games which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs but in which not all players seek to maximize their material payoffs. Specifically, a subset of players have negatively interdependent preferences and care not about their own material payoffs but also about their payoffs relative to others. We identify sufficient conditions under which members of the latter group have a strategic advantage in the following sense: at all intragrou...
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作者：Peitz, M
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：In a model of price competition single-product firms compete for consumers. Consumers purchase a variable quantity of one of the differentiated goods. The paper provides results on equilibrium existence when consumers are heterogeneous in their evaluation of the differentiated goods among each other, their evaluation of the differentiated goods relative to the outside good, and heterogeneous in income. Furthermore, I provide sufficient conditions for dominance solvability and monotone comparat...
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作者：Jullien, B
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要：This paper characterizes the optimal contract offered by an uninformed principal to an informed agent when the latter's reservation utility depends on his type. The informational rent is nonmonotonic so that interior types may have a vanishing rent or be excluded fron trade. The paper identifies conditions for the optimal contract to be seperating, to be nonstochastic, and to induce full participation. it also discusses the nature of the solution when bunching occurs. The results are applied t...
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作者：Aiyagari, SR; Williamson, SD
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Iowa
摘要：We construct a model with private information in which consumers write dynamic contracts with financial intermediaries. A role for money arises due to random limited participation of consumers in the financial market. Without defection constraints, a Friedman rule is optimal, the mean and variability of wealth tend to fall with inflation in the steady state, and the welfare effects of inflation are very small. With defection constraints, the effects of inflation on the distribution of welfare ...
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作者：Campbell, CM; Levin, D
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：In existing models of first-price common-value auctions, heterogeneous bidder information characterized by a well-informed insider is detrimental to the seller's revenue. We show that this is not a general principle. The linkage effect of increased information identified by Milgrom and Weber has force in our model of heterogeneous bidders, and dominates any adverse effects of an insider on revenues. In addition, a bidder with garbled information can profit in a first-price auction if his infor...
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作者：Chari, VV
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA
摘要：This introduces the Journal of Economic Theory symposium on political economy. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: P16. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
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作者：Ghiglino, C; Shell, K
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London; Cornell University; New York University
摘要：In overlapping-generations economies with perfect financial markets and lump-sum taxation, restrictions on the government budget deficit do not limit the set of achievable allocations. For economies in which the tax instruments are distortionary and limited in number, this strong form of irrelevance does not hold even if markets are perfect. We propose a weaker (but natural) definition of irrelevance in which only a finite (but arbitrarily large) number of restrictions near the baseline defici...
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作者：Kessler, AS
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper studies a stylized three-layer agency framework in which a principal hires a supervisor to monitor an agent's productive effort. It is demonstrated that the possibility of collusion imposes no additional cost on the principal if the supervisor's report is hard information, i.e., monitoring evidence call only be concealed and not forged. This result holds irrespective of the nature of the penalty that can be imposed on the agent. The findings suggest that it is strictly better for th...
