Renegotiation design with multiple regulators
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Martimort, D
署名单位：
Universite de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour; Universite de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2556
发表日期：
1999
页码：
261-293
关键词：
摘要：
One striking feature of the internal organization of governments is the existence of multiple regulators. This paper explains this organizational choice as coming from the government's limited ability to commit. The separation of powers between two regulators is modeled as a Stackelberg common agency game. With respect to the case of a single regulator, the allocative efficiency and the regulated firm's informational rent are both reduced in the unique equilibrium of this game. However, when regulators have a limited ability to commit, this static cost of regulators separation becomes a dynamic benefit. Separation makes renegotiation harder and improves commitment. (C) 1999 Academic Press.