Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Gretsky, NE; Ostroy, JM; Zame, WR
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California Riverside; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2540
发表日期：
1999
页码：
60-118
关键词：
摘要：
This paper provides a rigorous formalization, in the context of the transferable utility assignment model, of perfect competition as the inability of individuals to (favorably) influence prices. The central tool for the analysis is the social gains function; the central issue is differentiability of the gains function with respect to the population. Seven conditions are shown to be equivalent to perfect competition. Perfect competition and imperfect competition are possible for both finite and continuum assignment economies, but most finite economics are imperfectly competitive, while most continuum economies are perfectly competitive. However, most large finite assignment economies are approximately perfectly competitive. Classification Numbers: CGI. C62, C78. (C) 1999 Academic Press.