-
作者：Velez, Rodrigo A.
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We study the incentive properties of envy-free mechanisms for the allocation of rooms and payments of rent among financially constrained roommates. Each agent reports their values for rooms, their housing earmark (soft budget), and a coefficient that reflects the difficulty the agent experiences from having to pay over this amount. Then an envy-free allocation for these reports is recommended. The complete information non-cooperative outcomes of each of these mechanisms are exactly the envy-fr...
-
作者：Amir, Rabah; Jin, Jim Y.; Lasselle, Laurence
作者单位：University of Iowa; Universite de Rennes; University of St Andrews; University of St Andrews
摘要：In a perfectly competitive market and in multi-product monopoly with linear demands and costs, the socially optimal taxes are Ramsey independent taxes (RIT), which are independent of each other, have a simple structure, reduce all products proportionally, and affect consumers and firms in similar ways. Under imperfect competition, while not optimal in general for both social welfare and consumer surplus objectives, RIT nevertheless retain attractive uniform effects in all markets. In asymmetri...
-
作者：Dhami, Sanjit; Wei, Mengxing; al-Nowaihi, Ali
作者单位：University of Leicester; Nankai University; University of Leicester
摘要：We derive and test the predictions of three competing models of gift exchange: Classical (CGE); Augmented (AGE) based on unexpected wage surprises; and Belief-based (BGE) that uses belief hierarchies to formally model reciprocity and guilt-aversion. Following Akerlof (1982), we also introduce signals of the typical wage, Ow, and effort level, Oe, in similar firms. We examine the worker's optimal effort in response to exogenous variation in the wage, w, the signals Ow, Oe, and a signal of the f...
-
作者：Herold, Florian; Netzer, Nick
作者单位：Otto Friedrich University Bamberg; University of Zurich
摘要：Non-linear probability weighting is an integral part of descriptive theories of choice under risk such as prospect theory. But why do these objective errors in information processing exist? Should we try to help individuals overcome their mistake of overweighting small and underweighting large probabilities? In this paper, we argue that probability weighting can be seen as a compensation for preexisting biases in evaluating payoffs. In particular, inverse S-shaped probability weighting is a fl...
-
作者：Bravard, Christophe; Durieu, Jacques; Sarangi, Sudipta; Semirat, Stephan
作者单位：Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA); INRAE; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：We study message credibility in social networks with biased and unbiased agents. Biased agents prefer a specific outcome while unbiased agents prefer the true state of the world. Each agent who receives a message knows the identity (but not type) of the message creator and only the identity and types of their immediate neighbors. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game and demonstrate filtering by the network: the posterior beliefs of agents depend on the distance a messag...
-
作者：Han, Lining; Juarez, Ruben; Vargas, Miguel
作者单位：Wuhan University; University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii System
摘要：We study robust equilibria in tournaments, where agents endowed with power form coalitions, and the coalition formed with the highest power prevails. We introduce the No-Threat Equilibrium (NTE), a stable partition where if a coalition deviates, then a new coalition could counter by forming an even stronger coalition. The NTE exists for any power function and preferences if and only if the set of feasible coalitions is a 'Helly' family. In contrast, the core is a partition in which no group of...
-
作者：Fournier, Gaetan; Francou, Amaury
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：We study a class of location games where players want to attract as many resources as possible and pay a cost when deviating from an exogenous reference location. This class of games includes political competitions between policy-interested parties and firms' costly horizontal differentiation. We find that the introduction of reference locations simplifies the set of pure-strategy equilibrium to a unique candidate which has a strong property: at most four players, the two most-left and two mos...
-
作者：Dickinson, David L.; Masclet, David
作者单位：University of North Carolina; Appalachian State University; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Universite de Rennes; Universite de Rennes; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Insufficient sleep is costly to organizations (e.g., direct health costs, cognitive errors, accident risk, and lower labor productivity). In this current study, we examine another more hidden cost associated with insufficient sleep- unethical behaviors. Using a hybrid field/lab experimental approach, participants were randomly assigned to a week of sleep -restriction or well-rested sleep levels in their at-home (naturalistic) environment prior to decision making. We found that sleep restricted...
-
作者：Einy, Ezra; Haimanko, Ori
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We prove the existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games with absolutely continuous information and a Bayesian potential that is upper semi -continuous in actions for any realization of the players' types. In particular, all Bayesian potential games with finitely many actions and absolutely continuous information possess a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Noor, Jawwad; Ren, Linxia
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：Submitting to temptation gives rise to guilt, and the anticipation of guilt can generate guilt-avoidance. But guilt-avoidance may itself cause guilt. To account for this, we model guilt-avoidance as a temptation. The model unifies evidence pertaining to social preferences, perfectionism and information avoidance. While the social preference literature interprets moral hypocrisy as reflecting selfishness in true preferences, the model suggests that it may reflect a temptation to be selfish inst...
