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作者：Li, Mengling; Riyanto, Yohanes E.; Xu, Menghan
作者单位：Xiamen University; Nanyang Technological University
摘要：We study the efficacy of the donor-priority rule in promoting deceased organ donation under blood-type compatibility constraints in both theory and the laboratory. Compared with an allocation policy in which transplantations are performed only within the same blood-type group, we find that transferring organs across blood-type compatible groups discourages the donation incentives of hard-to-match agents and reduces the supply of the more widely acceptable type of organ. Meanwhile, the easy-to-...
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作者：Petri, Henrik
作者单位：University of Bath
摘要：We characterize the single-crossing random utility model (SCRUM) (Apesteguia et al. (2017)) restricted to the (experimentally and empirically) important domain of binary choice menus. As corollaries we characterize some important subclasses of SCRUM (such as single-peaked and single-dipped random utility models) on this domain. In doing so, we address instances of the (still unsolved) binary random utility problem, which asks under what conditions there is a random utility model consistent wit...
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作者：Izquierdo, Segismundo S.; Izquierdo, Luis R.
作者单位：Universidad de Valladolid; Universidad de Burgos; Universidad de Valladolid
摘要：We consider population games played by procedurally rational players who, when revising their current strategy, test each of their available strategies independently in a series of random matches -i.e., a battery of tests-, and then choose the strategy that performed best in this battery of tests. This revision protocol leads to the so-called payoff-sampling dynamics (aka test-all Best Experienced Payoff dynamics).In this paper we characterize the support of all the rest points of these dynami...
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作者：Wu, Wenhao; Ye, Bohan
作者单位：ShanghaiTech University
摘要：We experimentally investigate whether competition stimulates information revelation, by comparing two Bayesian persuasion models. One model has one sender (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011), and the other has two competing senders who move sequentially (Wu, 2022). The one-sender treatment provides strong support for Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), where the sender uses a noisy signaling device and the receiver complies with his suggestions. In the two-sender treatment, we find that: (1) overall, send...
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作者：Schmitt, Stefanie Y.; Bruckner, Dominik
作者单位：Otto Friedrich University Bamberg
摘要：We analyze firms' incentives to disclose deficiencies that reduce the quality of goods when consumers lack information. We distinguish two types of information: First, only some consumers are aware of the existence of deficiencies. Second, only some consumers have the expertise to infer the true levels of deficiencies once they are aware of the existence of deficiencies. We show that the interplay of awareness and expertise affects firms' incentives to disclose. In particular, an equilibrium w...
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作者：Brandt, Felix; Lederer, Patrick; Suksompong, Warut
作者单位：Technical University of Munich; National University of Singapore
摘要：Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the ordinal preferences of voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. To study the axiomatic properties of SDSs, we lift preferences over alternatives to preferences over lotteries using the natural- but little understood-pairwise comparison (PC) preference extension. This extension postulates that one lottery is preferred to another if the former is more likely to return a preferred outcome. We settle three open qu...
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作者：Aycinena, Diego; Elbittar, Alexander; Gomberg, Andrei; Rentschler, Lucas
作者单位：Universidad del Rosario; Chapman University System; Chapman University; Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas A.C. (CIDE); Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Utah System of Higher Education; Utah State University
摘要：Conventional wisdom suggests that promising free information to an agent would crowd out costly information acquisition. We theoretically demonstrate that this intuition only holds as a knife-edge case in which priors are symmetric. Indeed, when priors are asymmetric, a promise of free information in the future induces agents to increase information acquisition. In the lab, we test whether such crowding out occurs for both symmetric and asymmetric priors. Our results are qualitatively in line ...
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作者：Chakraborty, Anujit
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：This paper deploys a novel experiment to compare three behavioral theories that explain both selfish and non-selfish cooperation. The three theories fuse reputational cooperation (a la Kreps et al. (1982)) with the following three non-selfish motives respectively: caring about others (Altruism), being conscientious about cooperation (Duty), and enjoying social-efficiency (Efficiency-Seeking). We use reputational cooperation under purely Selfish preferences as a fourth theory. Our experimental ...
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作者：Bartling, Bjorn; Ozdemir, Yagiz
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：This paper studies the impact of a key feature of competitive markets on moral behavior: the possibility that a competitor might step in and conclude the deal if a conscientious market actor forgoes a profitable business opportunity for ethical reasons. In a series of experiments, we study whether people invoke the replacement excuse, that is, the argument if I don't do it, someone else will, to justify narrowly self-interested actions. Our data are consistent with the possibility that the exi...
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作者：Wasser, Cedric; Zhang, Mengxi
作者单位：University of Basel; University of Bonn
摘要：We study the design of all-pay contests when the organizer's objective is to maximize the expected winner's effort and contestants have private information about their valua-tions for the prize. We identify sufficient conditions for every optimal contest to involve differential treatment of ex ante symmetric contestants. Moreover, we provide a complete characterization of optimal contests when valuations are uniformly distributed. Finally, our results for the winner's effort also imply that di...
