Classical and belief-based gift exchange models: Theory and evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dhami, Sanjit; Wei, Mengxing; al-Nowaihi, Ali
• 署名单位: University of Leicester; Nankai University; University of Leicester
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.008
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 171-196
• 关键词: gift exchange; RECIPROCITY; Guilt -aversion; Psychological game theory; Belief -based models; Industry wage and effort norms

摘要

We derive and test the predictions of three competing models of gift exchange: Classical (CGE); Augmented (AGE) based on unexpected wage surprises; and Belief-based (BGE) that uses belief hierarchies to formally model reciprocity and guilt-aversion. Following Akerlof (1982), we also introduce signals of the typical wage, Ow, and effort level, Oe, in similar firms. We examine the worker's optimal effort in response to exogenous variation in the wage, w, the signals Ow, Oe, and a signal of the firm's expectations of effort from the worker, s. All three models predict gift exchange, however, the predictions of the AGE and the CGE models with respect to Ow, Oe, and s, are rejected. The BGE model successfully explains the data in all these respects. Gift exchange is underpinned by guilt-aversion. We also provide novel empirical evidence of first order stochastic dominance of first and second order beliefs.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.