Uniform, efficient and independent Ramsey taxes across markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Amir, Rabah; Jin, Jim Y.; Lasselle, Laurence
• 署名单位: University of Iowa; Universite de Rennes; University of St Andrews; University of St Andrews
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.010
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 373-386
• 关键词: Ramsey tax; optimal taxation; imperfect competition; Marginal cost of taxation; Multi-market oligopoly

摘要

In a perfectly competitive market and in multi-product monopoly with linear demands and costs, the socially optimal taxes are Ramsey independent taxes (RIT), which are independent of each other, have a simple structure, reduce all products proportionally, and affect consumers and firms in similar ways. Under imperfect competition, while not optimal in general for both social welfare and consumer surplus objectives, RIT nevertheless retain attractive uniform effects in all markets. In asymmetric Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies, the socially and consumer-efficient taxes are surprisingly complex even in simple settings. Postulating a third objective of taxation as the average of social welfare and consumer surplus restores the optimality of RIT. Finally, another important property is that RIT impose equal corresponding marginal costs across all types of markets, as required for economy-wide efficient taxation.(c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.