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作者：Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; Yamada, Takashi
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Cote d'Azur; University of Osaka; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Yamaguchi University
摘要：We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand based Winter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell mechanism better induces players to cooperate and to agree on an efficient outcome, whereas the demand-based Winter mechanism better implements allocations that refle...
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作者：Cai, Xinyue; Kimya, Mert
作者单位：Rice University; University of Sydney
摘要：We investigate whether peace can be achieved through the formation of an alliance network, where an alliance designates the possibility of coordinating joint offensive and defensive military action. If players are myopic then no alliance network is peaceful in the absence of trade (see Jackson and Nei (2015)). In contrast, we show that if players anticipate that an initial act of aggression can result in further conflict then peaceful alliance networks can be constructed by dividing the player...
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作者：He, Wei; Li, Jiangtao
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; Singapore Management University
摘要：We analyze the role of competition in information provision in random search markets. Multiple symmetric senders compete for the receiver's investment by disclosing information about their respective project qualities, and the receiver conducts random search to learn about the qualities of the projects. We show that in any symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium, each sender chooses a strategy with the lowest possible reservation value. There is no active search, and the receiver does not ben...
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作者：Lee, Yong-Ju; Lim, Wooyoung; Zhao, Chen
作者单位：Yeungnam University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of Hong Kong
摘要：We investigate how prior-biased inferences change players' strategic incentives and result in novel welfare implications in the canonical framework of strategic information transmission. The ex ante social welfare achieved in our model exceeds the upper bound characterized in the standard environment without prior bias. The welfare gain stems from the fact that the receiver's prior bias weakens the link between the sender's message and the receiver's response without contaminating the actual c...
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作者：Soraperra, Ivan; van der Weele, Joel; Villeval, Marie Claire; Shalvi, Shaul
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：We experimentally study the social transmission of inconvenient information about the externalities generated by one's own decision. In the laboratory, we pair uninformed decision makers with informed senders. Compared to a setting where subjects can choose their information directly, we find that social interactions increase selfish decisions. On the supply side, senders suppress almost 30 percent of inconvenient information, driven by their own preferences for information and their beliefs a...
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作者：Cho, Wonki Jo; Thomson, William
作者单位：Korea University; University of Rochester
摘要：We consider the problem of allocating a social endowment of private goods among a group of ������ agents with linear preferences. We search for rules that satisfy three standard requirements. First is (Pareto-)efficiency. Second is the fairness requirement of equal treatment of equals (in welfare terms). Third is the incentive requirement of strategy-proofness: no agent should ever benefit from misrepresenting their preferences. We show that no such rule exists. A variety of domains have...
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作者：Taub, B.
作者单位：University of Glasgow
摘要：I examine strategic behavior for a duopoly in a noisy environment. Firms attempt to learn the value of the rival's privately observed demand shocks via a noisy signal of price , at the same time firms attempt to obfuscate that signal by producing excess output on the publicly observable signals, that is, they signal jam.In a dynamic setting firms also distort the intertemporal structure of output keyed to the publicly observable demand shock process in order to disguise their private shocks. T...
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作者：Hwang, Ilwoo
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：When is an incumbent incentivized to experiment with risky reform policy in the presence of future elections? We study a dynamic game between two political parties with heterogeneous preferences and a voter. The voter elects a party that then chooses a policy from a status quo and two risky reform policies. Under infrequent elections, the incumbent party experiments with its preferred reform policy even if its outlook is not promising. In contrast, with overly frequent elections, the incumbent...
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作者：Berkemer, Rainer; Starke, Jens; Kawamoto, Atsushi
作者单位：University of Rostock; Toyota Central R&D Labs Inc
摘要：The traveler's dilemma is characterized by a strict Nash equilibrium that is Paretoinefficient. Even though a coordinated choice of more efficient options would be preferred by both players, any individual deviation from Nash behavior will induce a lower payoff. Yet experimental behavior reported in the literature demonstrates that deviations from Nash behavior toward Pareto-better outcomes are typical. An application of the sampling dynamics to this dilemma further justifies the non-Nash beha...
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作者：Haan, Marco A.; Heijnen, Pim; Obradovits, Martin
作者单位：University of Groningen; University of Innsbruck
摘要：Retail prices in stores are often lower than widely advertised list prices. We study the competitive role of such list prices in a homogeneous product duopoly where firms first set list prices before setting possibly reduced retail prices. Building on Varian (1980), we assume that some consumers observe no prices, some observe all prices, and some only observe the more salient list prices. We show that when the latter group chooses myopically, firms' ability to use list prices lowers average t...
