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作者：Siani, Joseph; Tedjeugang, Narcisse; Tchantcho, Bertrand
作者单位：IESEG School of Management; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Universite de Lille; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); University of Yaounde I; CY Cergy Paris Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：The influence relation, defined within the set of simple games, is identified as a preorder. Additionally, it is proved to be a subpreorder of the preorders induced by the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf-Coleman indices. When this relation extends to voting games with abstention, detailed in Tchantcho et al. (2008), and further to multichoice voting games as in Pongou et al. (2014), it is shown that these extensions aren't always preorders. Even when they are, they don't necessarily align with the ...
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作者：Attanasi, Giuseppe; Rimbaud, Claire; Villeval, Marie Claire
作者单位：Sapienza University Rome; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：We investigate whether players' guilt aversion is modulated by their co-players vulnerability. In new variations of a three-player Trust game, we manipulate payoff-vulnerability and endowment-vulnerability. The former (standard) vulnerability arises when a player's material payoff depends on another player's action. The latter arises when a player's initial endowment is entrusted to another player. Treatments vary whether trustees can condition their decision on the belief of a co-player who i...
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作者：Battigalli, P.; Catonini, E.; Manili, J.
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; New York University; NYU Shanghai; Northwestern University
摘要：A central aspect of strategic reasoning in sequential games consists in anticipating how co-players would react to information about past play, which in turn depends on how co-players update and revise their beliefs. Several notions of belief system have been used to model how players' beliefs change as they obtain new information, some imposing considerably more discipline than others on how beliefs at different information sets are related. We highlight the differences between these notions ...
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作者：Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit; Hernandez, Penelope; Neeman, Zvika; Solan, Eilon
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Valencia; Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：This paper addresses the question of how to best communicate information over time in order to influence an agent ' s belief and induced actions in a model with a binary state of the world that evolves according to a Markov process, and with a finite number of actions. We characterize the sender ' s optimal message strategy in the limit, as the length of each period decreases to zero. We show that the limit optimal strategy is myopic for beliefs smaller than the invariant distribution of the u...
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作者：Galeazzi, Paolo; Marti, Johannes
作者单位：University of Bayreuth; University of Bremen
摘要：Following the decision-theoretic approach to game theory, we extend the analysis of Epstein and Wang (1996) and Di Tillio (2008) from hierarchies of preference relations to hierarchies of choice functions. We then construct the universal choice structure containing all these choice hierarchies, and show how the universal preference structure from Di Tillio (2008) is embedded in it. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Zhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro
作者单位：Kyoto University; University of Osaka; University of Osaka
摘要：In multi-object auction models with unit demand agents, two standard assumptions are the quasi-linearity of utility functions and the coincidence between price increment and valuation unit. Under these assumptions, the exact ascending auction of Demange et al. (1986), the sealed-bid Vickrey auction, as well as the approximate ascending auction of Demange et al. (1986) identify the minimum price equilibrium (MPE) while elegantly exhibiting efficiency and incentive-compatibility. We demonstrate ...
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作者：Leng, Ailin
作者单位：Nanjing Audit University
摘要：I conduct a bargaining experiment with discounting in continuous time. At any point in time, each of the two players can make a proposal. However, after making an offer, a player must wait for a specific duration of waiting time before she can make a new offer or accept the other's offer. In addition, the player's share is discounted by her discount rate for every unit of time. In the equilibrium, the agreement is reached immediately, and a player's share increases with her waiting time and de...
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作者：Bentert, Matthias; Boehmer, Niclas; Heeger, Klaus; Koana, Tomohiro
作者单位：Technical University of Berlin
摘要：We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are t layers each consisting of one preference order for each agent. Recently, Chen et al. [EC '18] studied such problems with strict preferences, establishing four multilayer adaptations of classical notions of stability. We follow up on their work by analyzing the computational complexity of stable matching problems with multilayer approval preferences, which leads to problems that are incomparable to the previ...
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作者：Hill, Brian
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：Although much of the theoretical and applied literature involving decision under ambiguity works under the assumption of uncertainty aversion, experimental evidence suggests that it is not a universal behavioural trait. This paper introduces and axiomatises the family of a-UA (for a-Uncertainty Attitude) preferences: a simple extension of uncertainty averse preferences with a Hurwicz-style mixing coefficient, so as to admit a richer range of uncertainty attitudes. The parameters of the model a...
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作者：Ackfeld, Viola; Gueth, Werner
作者单位：University of Cologne; Max Planck Society
摘要：Personal information is shared extensively every day, particularly when competing for others' attention on online platforms. In this paper, we experimentally investigate the interaction of peer comparison and incentives as drivers to disclose potentially privacysensitive information. We find that information sharing is higher under incentives, and further increases under peer comparison. This effect is driven by those initially disclosing less, who additionally report feeling more compelled to...
