Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Einy, Ezra; Haimanko, Ori
• 署名单位: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.004
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 341-347
• 关键词: Bayesian games; Bayesian potential; Pure-strategy equilibrium; Continuous payoffs; Absolute continuity of information; purification

摘要

We prove the existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games with absolutely continuous information and a Bayesian potential that is upper semi -continuous in actions for any realization of the players' types. In particular, all Bayesian potential games with finitely many actions and absolutely continuous information possess a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.