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作者：Jalota, Devansh; Pavone, Marco; Qi, Qi; Ye, Yinyu
作者单位：Stanford University; Renmin University of China
摘要：The Fisher market is one of the most fundamental models for resource allocation. However, Fisher markets are less amenable for resource allocation settings when agents have additional linear constraints beyond the budget constraints of buyers and the capacity constraints of goods. Thus, in this work, we introduce a modified Fisher market, where agents may have additional linear constraints, and study the properties of the resulting equilibria. To set equilibrium prices, we introduce a budget-a...
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作者：Rosner, Shaul; Tamir, Tami
作者单位：Reichman University
摘要：Job scheduling on parallel machines is a well-studied singleton congestion game. We consider a variant of this game, arising in environments with strong competition. In a scheduling game with rank-based utilities (SRBG) the players are partitioned into competition sets, and the goal of every player is to perform well relative to its competitors. We show that SRBGs are significantly different from classical job-scheduling games, and that competition may lead to poor outcomes. An SRBG need not h...
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作者：Wang, Bo; Zhou, Zhen
作者单位：Ningbo University of Finance & Economics; Tsinghua University
摘要：This paper develops a model to investigate the interaction between collective decision making in voting and financial speculation. Protesting voters demand policy reforms by voting against the incumbent, but too many opposing votes result in an unfavorable outcome: a political regime change. Traders speculate on the change of the political regime. The size of the speculation informs voters about the electorate's composition, thereby influencing the outcome of the election. We find that, in equ...
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作者：Backhaus, Teresa; Huck, Steffen; Leutgeb, Johannes; Oprea, Ryan
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of London; University College London; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：We demonstrate in a laboratory experiment in which subjects play a two-player CournotTullock game over hundreds of periods of varying length that full accounts of subjects' learning requires the consideration of, both, 'period time' and 'physical time.'& COPY; 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Cui, Zhiwei
作者单位：Renmin University of China
摘要：We consider a model of social coordination and network formation where agents decide on an action in a coordination game and on whom to form costly links with. We explore the role of linking friction, where an agent cannot change all of her links simultaneously when choosing an alternative linking decision. Given linking friction, interaction structures are not fully flexible. We introduce a new solution concept of static equilibria, local Nash equilibria, and find that the set of local Nash e...
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作者：Lahkar, Ratul; Mukherjee, Sayan; Roy, Souvik
作者单位：Ashoka University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：We consider large population supermodular games with pairwise interaction and a continuous strategy set. Our objective is to establish convergence of the logit dynamic in such games to logit equilibria. For this purpose, we apply the deterministic approximation approach, which interprets a deterministic dynamic as an approximation of a stochastic process. We first establish the closeness of this dynamic with a step-wise approximation. We then show that the logit stochastic process is close to ...
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作者：Jin, Ye; Zhou, Zhen; Brandenburger, Adam
作者单位：New York University; NYU Shanghai; Tsinghua University; New York University; New York University Tandon School of Engineering
摘要：This paper studies the effect of introducing an option of delay in coordination games- that is, of allowing players to wait and then choose between the risk-dominant and payoff-dominant actions. The delay option enables forward-induction reasoning to operate, whereby a player's waiting and not choosing the risk-dominant action right away signals an intention to choose the payoff-dominant action later. If players have epsilon-social preferences- they help others if they can do so at no cost to ...
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作者：Aziz, Haris; Lee, Barton E.
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Oxford
摘要：A well-known axiom for proportional representation is Proportionality for Solid Coalitions (PSC). We characterize committees satisfying PSC as the range of outcomes obtained by the class of Minimal Demand rules, which generalizes an approach pioneered by eminent philosopher Sir Michael Dummett. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Tajika, Tomoya
摘要：We study a common-value voting model, in which private signal is typically informative but may be unreliable. Reliability determines the precision and the meaning of voters' private signals. These private signals are negatively correlated between different reliabilities. Each voter also receives noisy signals about reliability itself. When the population is sufficiently large, a bad equilibrium exists, in which all voters ignore reliability signals. It is thus possible that, at equilibrium, th...
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作者：Georgiadis, George; Kim, Youngsoo; Kwon, H. Dharma
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We consider a two-player game of war of attrition under complete information. It is well-known that this class of games admits equilibria in pure, as well as mixed strategies, and much of the literature has focused on the latter. We show that if the players' payoffs whilst in war vary stochastically and their exit payoffs are heterogeneous, then the game admits Markov Perfect equilibria in pure strategies only. This is true irrespective of the degree of randomness and heterogeneity, thus highl...
