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作者：Chatterji, Shurojit; Zeng, Huaxia
作者单位：Singapore Management University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：Non-dictatorial preference domains allow the design of unanimous social choice functions (henceforth, rules) that are non-dictatorial and strategy-proof. On a class of preference domains called unidimensional domains, we show that the unique seconds property (introduced by Aswal et al., 2003) characterizes all non-dictatorial domains. Subsequently, we provide an exhaustive classification of all non-dictatorial, unidimensional domains, based on a simple property of two-voter rules called invari...
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作者：Neyman, Abraham
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
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作者：Mackenzie, Andrew; Komornik, Vilmos
作者单位：Maastricht University; Universites de Strasbourg Etablissements Associes; Universite de Strasbourg
摘要：We investigate the fair division of a sequence of time slots when each agent is sufficiently patient. If agents have identical preferences, then we construct perfectly equitable and efficient allocations. Otherwise, (i) if there are two agents, then we construct envy -free allocations, (ii) if there are three agents, then we construct proportional allocations, and (iii) in general, we construct approximately fair allocations. Finally, we investigate achieving approximate fairness at each time ...
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作者：Panova, Elena
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a fixed tree-network among users with differentiated willingness to pay for the good supplied through the network. We find that the associated value-sharing problem is convex, hence, the core is large and we axiomatize a new, computationally simple core selection based on the idea of proportionality.
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作者：Ma, Siyu; Biran, Dov
作者单位：Beijing Jiaotong University; China University of Political Science & Law
摘要：This note stems from Jelnov et al. (2017), which analyzed the interaction of two enemy nations- Player 1 (the weak nation) and Player 2 (the strong nation). 1 (he) wishes to develop a nuclear bomb, and 2 (she) who employs a noisy intelligence system, IS, aims to deter him. Based on the signal sent by IS, 2 decides whether to attack 1. If the precision (a) of IS is commonly known, not only 2 is strictly better off with a better quality (higher precision) IS but also is 1. In contrast, this note...
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作者：Altuntas, Acelya; Phan, William; Tamura, Yuki
作者单位：Deakin University; North Carolina State University
摘要：Consider object exchange problems when each agent may be endowed with and consume more than one object. For most domains of preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, the endowment lower bound, and strategy-proofness. Insisting on the first two properties, we explore the extent to which weaker incentive compatibility can be achieved. Motivated by behavioral and computational considerations as well as online mechanisms, we define several forms of manipulation. We consider the lexicographic doma...
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作者：Li, Anqi; Hu, Lin
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; Australian National University
摘要：We study a model of electoral accountability and selection whereby heterogeneous voters aggregate incumbent politician's performance data into personalized signals through paying limited attention. Extreme voters' signals exhibit an own-party bias, which hampers their ability to discern the good and bad performances of the incumbent. While this effect alone would undermine electoral accountability and selection, there is a countervailing effect stemming from partisan disagreement, which makes ...
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作者：Mattsson, Lars-Goran; Weibull, Jorgen W.
作者单位：Royal Institute of Technology; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We analyze a principal-agent model with moral hazard where the principal is risk neutral while the agent is risk averse or risk neutral. The agent is free to choose any probability distribution over outcomes, where some distributions require more effort than others. The agent's effort-cost function is of Legendre type and satisfies an axiom of invariance under mergers of outcomes that are equally paid by the principal. We analyze a family of such effort-cost functions. For a canonical subclass...
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作者：Rapanos, Theodoros
作者单位：Sodertorn University
摘要：This paper studies learning through social networks in which agents update their beliefs by weighting those of their peers. We allow agents to pay little attention to peers with poor information at first, but more later on, as that peer acquires better information from more knowledgeable agents. We derive explicitly how social influence depends on agents' popularity (eigenvector centrality) and expertise (information precision) and show that even completely uninformed agents can contribute to ...
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作者：Louis, Philippos; Nunez, Matias; Xefteris, Dimitrios
作者单位：University of Cyprus; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：Eliminating - or trimming - extreme reports before aggregating them is usually motivated by the perception that it constitutes a remedy for strategic misreporting. This work focuses on the strategic calculus of voting when using trimmed-mean mechanisms for preference aggregation. Contrary to the above presumption, we show, both formally and experimentally that, under such mechanisms, voters persistently resort to strategic polarization for all but the most extreme levels of trimming. Furthermo...
