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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Takahashi, Satoru; Xiong, Siyang
作者单位：National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; University of Tokyo; University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：Following Fudenberg et al. (1988) and Dekel and Fudenberg (1990), we say that a refinement of (interim correlated) rationalizability is robust if it is prescribed by a solution correspondence that is upper hemicontinuous with respect to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We characterize robust refinements of rationalizability subject to arbitrary common knowledge restrictions on payoffs. We demonstrate how the characterization pins down a novel family of robust refinements of rationalizabi...
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作者：Babaioff, Moshe; Dobzinski, Shahar; Oren, Sigal
摘要：We study combinatorial auctions with bidders that exhibit an endowment effect. In most of the previous work on cognitive biases in algorithmic game theory the focus was on analyzing the implications and mitigating their negative consequences. In contrast, in this paper we show how in some cases cognitive biases can be harnessed to obtain better outcomes. Specifically, we study Walrasian equilibria in combinatorial markets. It is well known that Walrasian equilibria exist only in limited settin...
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作者：Kim, Kyungmin; Koh, Youngwoo
作者单位：Emory University; Korea University
摘要：We consider independent private value auctions in which prior to bidding, each bidder engages in fully flexible information acquisition, choosing not only how much information but also what information to acquire about his value. Focusing on a tractable environment with binary underlying values and posterior-separable information costs, we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and investigate the effects of information costs on auction outcomes. We also analyze how the reserve price in...
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作者：Alos-Ferrer, Carlos
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：The Chairman Paradox (Farquharson, 1969) is a classical observation in voting games showing that a Chairman endowed with tie-breaking power might end up with her worst outcome. The analysis posits three players whose preferences build a Condorcet cycle and invokes Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies (IEWDS) to select a unique equilibrium. However, IEWDS is a controversial procedure which exhibits well-known weaknesses. This work relies on non-controversial equilibrium refinemen...
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作者：Prato, Carlo; Wolton, Stephane
作者单位：Columbia University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：The Condorcet Jury Theorem and subsequent literature establish the feasibility of information aggregation in a common-value environment with exogenous policy options: a large electorate of imperfectly informed voters almost always selects the correct policy option. Rather than directly voting for policies, citizens in modern representative democracies elect candidates who make strategic policy commitments. We show that intermediation by candidates sometimes improves policy choices and sometime...
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作者：Ke, Changxia; Morath, Florian; Newell, Anthony; Page, Lionel
作者单位：Queensland University of Technology (QUT); University of Innsbruck; University of Queensland
摘要：In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how the prize is to be split among its members. However, in practical situations where coalitions are formed, the actual split of the prize often takes place after the coalition formation stage. This creates the possibility for some players to ask for a renegotiation of the initial split. We predict that, in such situations, a player can suffer from being too strong. Our experimen...
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作者：Afacan, Mustafa Oguz; Evdokimov, Piotr; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Turhan, Bertan
作者单位：Sabanci University; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); University of Lausanne; Iowa State University
摘要：When applying to schools, students often submit applications to distinct school systems that operate independently, which leads to waste and distortions of stability due to miscoordination. To alleviate this issue, Manjunath and Turhan (2016) introduce the Iterative Deferred Acceptance mechanism (IDA). We design an experiment to compare the performance of this mechanism under parallel markets (DecDA2) to the classic Deferred Acceptance mechanism with both divided (DecDA) and unified markets (D...
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作者：de Castro, Luciano; Galvao, Antonio F.; Noussair, Charles N.; Qiao, Liang
作者单位：University of Iowa; Michigan State University; University of Arizona
摘要：Quantiles are used for decision making in investment analysis and in the mining, oil and gas industries. However, it is unknown how common quantile-based decision making actually is among typical individual decision makers. This paper describes an experiment that aims to (1) compare how common is decision making based on quantiles relative to expected utility maximization, and (2) estimate risk attitude parameters under the assumption of quantile preferences. The experiment has two parts. In t...
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作者：Steg, Jan-Henrik
作者单位：University of Graz
摘要：In Smirnov and Wait (2021), an iterative method is devised to identify subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes of timing games. This note shows by simple examples that the identification is in fact neither necessary nor sufficient. The main issue is that the method does not fully reflect the requirements of subgame perfection, so there is a conceptual and not just a technical problem. (C) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper analyzes strategic information transmission between a sender and a receiver with similar objectives. We provide a first-order approximation of the equilibrium behavior in the general version of the Crawford and Sobel's (1982) model with a small bias. Our analysis goes beyond the usual uniform-quadratic setting: we uncover how the state-dependent bias and the non-uniform state distribution influence the precision with which each state of the world is communicated. We illustrate the a...
