-
作者：Allison, Blake A.; Bagh, Adib; Lepore, Jason J.
作者单位：Emory University; University of Kentucky; University of Kentucky; California State University System; California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo
摘要：We consider classes of games for a fixed set of players with fixed strategy sets. For such classes, we analyze and develop the concept of invariance, which is satisfied when the set of Nash equilibria and corresponding equilibrium payoffs are identical for each payoff function within the class. We introduce the condition superior payoff matching, which requires that at any given strategy profile, each player can match her highest payoff near that strategy profile across all games within that c...
-
作者：Matsushima, Hitoshi
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：We investigate the implementation of social choice functions (SCFs) from an epistemolog-ical perspective. We consider the possibility that in higher-order beliefs there exists an honest agent who is motivated by intrinsic preference for honesty as well as material in-terest. We assume weak honesty, in that, although any honest agent has a cost of lying that is positive but close to zero, she (or he) is mostly motivated by material interests and even tells white lies. This study assumes that al...
-
作者：Lukyanov, Georgy; Shamruk, Konstantin; Su, Tong; Wakrim, Ahmed
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：This paper develops a model in which a sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender's information. It is shown that aggregate payoff externalities create an endogenous conflict of interests between the sender and the receivers, rendering full information revelation, in general infeasible. We demonstrate that an exogenous bias in the sender's preferences can improve public information provision and raise welfare. Two applications of the setup ar...
-
作者：Vazirani, Vijay V.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：The classic paper of Shapley and Shubik (1971) characterized the core of the assignment game using ideas from matching theory and LP-duality theory and their highly non-trivial interplay. Whereas the core of this game is always non-empty, that of the general graph matching game can be empty. This paper salvages the situation by giving an imputation in the 2/3-approximate core for the latter; moreover this imputation can be computed in polynomial time. This bound is best possible, since it is t...
-
作者：Afacan, Mustafa Oguz
作者单位：Sabanci University
摘要：We introduce a college admission with tuition transfers problem. In this novel formulation, students' payments are not necessarily equal to their respective tuition fees. However, the total requested tuition fees must be equal to the total payment burden on students. We introduce two mechanism classes - the first is efficient, and the second is stable and constrained efficient. Because of general incompatibilities, neither of them is strategy-proof. Next, under certain suppositions, we introdu...
-
作者：Samet, Dov
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：The impossibility of agreeing to disagree in the non-probabilistic setup means that agents cannot commonly know their decisions unless they are all the same. We study the relation of this property to the sure thing principle when it is expressed in epistemic terms. We show that it can be presented in two equivalent ways: one is in terms of knowledge operators, which we call the principle of follow the knowledgeable, the other is in terms of kens-bodies of agents' knowledge-which we call indepe...
-
作者：Ivanov, Maxim; Sam, Alex
作者单位：McMaster University
摘要：The paper considers a cheap-talk model in which the receiver privately selects the signal structure of the initially uninformed sender. After the sender privately observes a signal generated by the signal structure, the players play a standard cheap-talk game. We show that by randomizing between two perfectly informative signal structures, the receiver can elicit perfect information from the sender for the bias in preferences of any magnitude, including the case when the bias is the sender's p...
-
作者：Can, Burak; Hougaard, Jens Leth; Pourpouneh, Mohsen
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Copenhagen; University of Oxford
摘要：This paper proposes a conceptual framework for the analysis of reward sharing schemes in mining pools, such as those associated with Bitcoin. The framework is centered around the reported shares in a pool instead of agents and introduces two new fairness criteria: absolute and relative redistribution. These criteria impose that the addition of a share to a round affects all previous shares of the round in the same way, either in absolute amount or in relative ratio. We characterize two large c...
-
作者：Ramezanian, Rasoul; Feizi, Mehdi
作者单位：Ferdowsi University Mashhad; Ferdowsi University Mashhad
摘要：A random assignment is robust ex-post Pareto efficient whenever for any of its lottery decomposition, each deterministic assignment in its support is Pareto efficient. We show that ordinal efficiency implies robust ex-post Pareto efficiency while the reverse does not hold. We know that strategy-proof and ordinal efficient mechanisms satisfy neither equal treatment of equals nor equal division lower bound. We prove that it is not possible to avoid these two impossibilities by weakening ordinal ...
-
作者：Kyropoulou, Maria; Ortega, Josue; Segal-Halevi, Erel
作者单位：University of Essex; Queens University Belfast; Ariel University
摘要：Using two lab experiments, we investigate the real-life performance of envy-free and proportional cake-cutting procedures with respect to fairness and preference manipulation. Although the observed subjects' strategic behavior eliminates the fairness guarantees of envy-free procedures, we nonetheless find evidence that suggests that envy-free procedures are fairer than their proportional counterparts. Our results support the practical use of the celebrated Selfridge-Conway procedure, and more ...
