Equitable rent division on a soft budget

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Velez, Rodrigo A.
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.008
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1-14
• 关键词: Budget constraints; Equitable rent division; market design; Algorithmic game theory; No -envy; Quasi -linear preferences

摘要

We study the incentive properties of envy-free mechanisms for the allocation of rooms and payments of rent among financially constrained roommates. Each agent reports their values for rooms, their housing earmark (soft budget), and a coefficient that reflects the difficulty the agent experiences from having to pay over this amount. Then an envy-free allocation for these reports is recommended. The complete information non-cooperative outcomes of each of these mechanisms are exactly the envy-free allocations with respect to true preferences if and only if the admissible budget violation coefficients have a bound.(c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.