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作者：Hwang, Sung-Ha; Koh, Youngwoo; Lu, Jingfeng
作者单位：Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST); Korea University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We study a contest problem in which two players compete on a continuum of battlefields by spending resources subject to some constraints on their strategies. Following Myerson (1993), we assume that each player's resource allocation on each battlefield is an independent random draw from the same distribution. Within each battlefield, the player who allocates a higher level of resources wins, but both players incur costs for resource allocation. To analyze this problem, we introduce a systemati...
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作者：Allouch, Nizar; Jalloul, Maya; Duncan, Alfred
作者单位：University of Kent; Lancaster University
摘要：This paper investigates a model of default in financial networks where the decision by one agent on whether or not to default impacts the incentives of other agents to escape default. Agents' payoffs are determined by the clearing mechanism introduced in the seminal contribution of Eisenberg and Noe (2001). We first show the existence of a Nash equilibrium of this default game. Furthermore, we develop an algorithm to find all Nash equilibria and guide regulatory intervention that relies on the...
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：We examine a version of the model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) in which agents are not biased, but their preferences are not necessarily smooth. In this situation, we show that communication converges to full information transmission as the number of messages used for communication increases if and only if the sender and the receiver have the same local relative preferences for avoiding small upward or downward mistakes. When these conditions fail, either an arbitrarily small bias or an arbitr...
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作者：Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Joergen
摘要：Theorem 1 in Alger and Weibull (2016, Games and Economic Behavior) consists of two statements. The first establishes that Homo moraliswith the right degree of morality is evolutionarily stable. The second statement is a claim about sufficient conditions for other goal functions to be evolutionarily unstable. However, the proof given for that claim presumes that all relevant sets are non-empty, while the hypothesis of the theorem does not guarantee that. We here prove instability under a strong...
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作者：McClellan, Andrew
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：We study whether an auctioneer should let bidders see their opponents' identities in a common-value second-price auction when bidders are uncertain about whether their opponents are more informed than they are. The presence of information asymmetries among bidders can lead to an exacerbated winner's curse for less informed bidders and large decreases in auction revenue. We find that letting bidders see who their opponents are (and identify if a more informed bidder is present) leads to lower e...
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作者：Song, Yangwei
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：This paper provides a micro-foundation for approximate incentive compatibility using ambiguity aversion. In particular, we propose a novel notion of approximate interim incentive compatibility, approximate local incentive compatibility, and establish an equivalence between approximate local incentive compatibility in a Bayesian environment and exact interim incentive compatibility in the presence of a small degree of ambiguity. We then apply our result to the implementation of efficient alloca...
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作者：de Pinto, Marco; Goerke, Laszlo; Palermo, Alberto
作者单位：Universitat Trier; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：We consider a principal-agent relationship with adverse selection. Principals pay infor-mational rents due to asymmetric information and sell their output in a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly. We find that asymmetric information may mitigate or more than com-pensate the welfare reducing impact of market power, irrespective of whether the number of firms is given exogenously or determined endogenously by a profit constraint. We further show that welfare in a setting with adverse selection may be ...
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作者：Boissonnet, Niels; Ghersengorin, Alexis; Gleyze, Simon
作者单位：University of Munster; Paris School of Economics
摘要：We propose a model of deliberate preference change that is identifiable, empirically testable, and founded on two normative principles. First, the decision maker (DM) must be able to justify her preference change by making attributes of the alternatives relevant or irrelevant to her choices. Second, DM's successive preference changes must result from consistent deliberations about which attributes to make relevant or irrelevant for her future choices. We show that these two principles are nece...
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作者：Xefteris, Dimitrios
作者单位：University of Cyprus
摘要：Divided majorities can effectively harmonize their votes by the means of algorithmic co-ordinators: mechanisms that aggregate reported preferences and issue voting recommen-dations. We focus on incentive-compatible coordinators, and study their effect on social welfare. While some of them are highly efficient, contrary to common wisdom, some others are welfare reducing, even compared to when no coordinator exists. We conduct a laboratory investigation that provides strong support for these the...
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作者：Gutin, Gregory Z.; Neary, Philip R.; Yeo, Anders
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Southern Denmark; University of Johannesburg
摘要：In this paper we consider the issue of a unique prediction in one-to-one two-sided matching markets, as defined by Gale and Shapley (1962), and we prove the following:Theorem. Let P be a one-to-one two-sided matching market and let P* be its associated normal form, a (weakly) smaller matching market with the same set of stable matchings that can be obtained using procedures introduced in Irving and Leather (1986) and Balinski and Ratier (1997). The following three statements are equivalent:(a)...
