Location games with references

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fournier, Gaetan; Francou, Amaury
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.012
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 17-32
• 关键词: Location games; spatial competition; Spatial voting theory; Costly product differentiation

摘要

We study a class of location games where players want to attract as many resources as possible and pay a cost when deviating from an exogenous reference location. This class of games includes political competitions between policy-interested parties and firms' costly horizontal differentiation. We find that the introduction of reference locations simplifies the set of pure-strategy equilibrium to a unique candidate which has a strong property: at most four players, the two most-left and two most-right, deviate from their reference locations. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the candidate to be an equilibrium. We illustrate our results in particular cases including the duopoly competition where we moderate the principle of minimal differentiation. & COPY; 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.