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作者：Schummer, J
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We relax strategy-proofness (a form of dominant strategy implementation) by allowing small gains from manipulation. In 2-agent exchange economies, this relaxation is shown to have a discontinuous effect on the range of efficient rules, demonstrating a type of non-robustness in previous impossibility results. When gains are measured with respect to a single good and preferences are linear, we characterize a particular rule as being the most equitable among all efficient rules satisfying the rel...
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作者：Pápai, S
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：We investigate the uniqueness of stable coalition structures in a simple coalition formation model, for which specific coalition formation games, such as the marriage and roommate models, are special cases that are obtained by restricting the coalitions that may form. The main result is a characterization of collections of permissible coalitions which ensure that there is a unique stable coalition structure in the corresponding coalition formation model. In particular, we show that only single...
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作者：Mutuswami, S; Pérez-Castrillo, D; Wettstein, D
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Essex; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：In this paper, we consider a local public goods environment. The agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. We propose a bidding mechanism whereby agents bid for the right to decide upon the organization of the economic activity. The sub-game perfect equilibria of the mechanism generate efficient outcomes. We also show how to adapt the mechanism to network economies where the economic activity takes place via the formation of links. (C...
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作者：Holzman, R; Kfir-Dahav, N; Monderer, D; Tennenholtz, M
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper analyzes ex post equilibria in the VCG combinatorial auctions. If Sigma is a family of bundles of goods, the organizer may restrict the bundles on which the participants submit bids, and the bundles allocated to them, to be in Sigma. The Sigma-VCG combinatorial auctions obtained in this way are known to be truth-telling mechanisms. In contrast, this paper deals with non-restricted VCG auctions, in which the buyers choose strategies that involve bidding only on bundles in Sigma, and ...
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作者：Friedman, E; Shor, M; Shenker, S; Sopher, B
作者单位：Cornell University; Vanderbilt University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：We present the results of an experiment on learning in a continuous-time low-information setting. For a dominance solvable version of a Cournot oligopoly with differentiated products, we find little evidence of convergence to the Nash equilibrium. In an asynchronous setting, characterized by players updating their strategies at different frequencies, play tends toward the Stackelberg outcome which favors the slower player. Convergence is significantly more robust for a serial cost sharing game...
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作者：Spiegler, R
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：I explore the idea of simplicity as a belief-selection criterion in games. A pair of strategies in finite-automata representation (s(1), s(2)) is a Simple Nash Equilibrium (SINE) if: (1) s(j) is a best-reply to s(i); (2) every automaton for player j, which generates the same path as s(j) (given s(i)), has at least as many states as s(j). I apply SINE to a bilateral concession game and show that it captures an aspect of bargaining behavior: players employ delay tactics in order to justify their...
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作者：Moldovanu, B
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作者：Board, O
作者单位：Amherst College
摘要：The epistemic program in game theory uses formal models of interactive reasoning to provide foundations for various game-theoretic solution concepts. Much of this work is based around the (static) Aumann structure model of interactive epistemology, but more recently dynamic models of interactive reasoning have been developed, most notably by Stalnaker [Econ. Philos. 12 (1996) 133163] and Battigalli and Siniscalchi [J. Econ. Theory 88 (1999) 188-230], and used to analyze rational play in extens...
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作者：Morris, S; Ui, T
作者单位：Yale University; Yokohama National University
摘要：Two games are best-response equivalent if they have the same best-response correspondence. We provide a characterization of when two games are best-response equivalent. The characterizations exploit a dual relationship between payoff differences and beliefs. Some potential game arguments [Games Econ. Behav. 14 (1996) 124] rely only on the property that potential games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games. Our results show that a large class of games are best-response equiva...
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作者：Cason, TN; Saijo, T; Yamato, T; Yokotani, K
作者单位：University of Osaka; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology
摘要：We conduct a two-stage game experiment with a non-excludable public good. In the first stage, two subjects choose simultaneously whether or not they commit to contributing nothing to provide a pure public good. In the second stage, knowing the other subject's commitment decision, subjects who did not commit in the first stage choose contributions to the public good. We found no support for the evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium, and the ratio of subjects who did not commit to contributin...
