Dynamic interactive epistemology

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Board, O
• 署名单位: Amherst College
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.006
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 49-80
• 关键词: interactive epistemology; beliefs; belief revision; semantic; syntactic; language; canonical structure

摘要

The epistemic program in game theory uses formal models of interactive reasoning to provide foundations for various game-theoretic solution concepts. Much of this work is based around the (static) Aumann structure model of interactive epistemology, but more recently dynamic models of interactive reasoning have been developed, most notably by Stalnaker [Econ. Philos. 12 (1996) 133163] and Battigalli and Siniscalchi [J. Econ. Theory 88 (1999) 188-230], and used to analyze rational play in extensive form games. But while the properties of Aumann structures are well understood, without a formal language in which belief and belief revision statements can be expressed, it is unclear exactly what are the properties of these dynamic models. Here we investigate this question by defining such a language. A semantics and syntax are presented, with soundness and completeness theorems linking the two. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.