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作者：Gneezy, U; Haruvy, E; Roth, AE
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Chicago; Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Harvard University
摘要：We study a reverse ultimatum game, in which proposers have multiple chances to offer responders a division of some fixed pie. The game ends if the responder accepts an offer, or if, following a rejection, the proposer decides not to make a better offer. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium gives the proposer the minimum possible payoff. Nevertheless, the experimental results are not too different from those of the standard ultimatum game, although proposers generally receive slightly less th...
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作者：Hart, S; Mas-Colell, A
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：\Regret-based dynamics have been introduced and studied in the context of discrete-time repeated play. Here we carry out the corresponding analysis in continuous time. We observe that, in contrast to (smooth) fictitious play or to evolutionary models, the appropriate state space for this analysis is the space of distributions on the product of the players' pure action spaces (rather than the product of their mixed action spaces). We obtain relatively simple proofs for some results known in the...
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作者：Aumann, RJ
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：The Presidential Address at the First International Congress of the Game Theory Society, held in Bilbao, Spain, in July of 2000. The address contains a discussion of the Congress, of the functions and activities of the Society, of the Logo of the Society, of past accomplishments of the discipline, and of some future directions for research. The address is preceded by an introduction by David Kreps. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Abreu, D; Sethi, R
作者单位：Columbia University; Princeton University
摘要：A large and growing literature on reputation in games builds on the insight that the possibility of one or more players being boundedly rational can have significant effects on equilibrium behavior. This literature leaves unexplained the presence of behavioral players in the first place, as well as the particular forms of irrationality assumed and the population shares of the various types. In this paper we endogenize departures from rationality on the basis of an evolutionary stability criter...
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作者：Wärneryd, K
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We study the evolution of an economy where agents who are heterogeneous with respect to risk attitudes can either earn a certain income or enter a risky rent-seeking contest. We assume that agents behave rationally given their preferences, but that the population distribution of preferences evolves over time in response to material payoffs. We show that, in particular, initial distributions with full support converge to stationary states where all types are still present. Although rents are pe...
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作者：Mattsson, LG; Weibull, JW
作者单位：Boston University; Royal Institute of Technology
摘要：We derive a family of probabilistic choice models, including the multinomial logit model, from a microecononic model in which the decision maker has to make some effort in order to implement any desired outcome. The disutility of this effort enters the decision maker's goal function in an additively separable way. A particular disutility function, yielding the multinomial logit as a special case, is characterized axiamatically. The present approach naturally leads to a normalization of the ach...
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作者：Charness, G; Haruvy, E
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motives must be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recent theories of nonpecuniary motives can be classified as altruism-, equity-, or reciprocity-based. We outline the qualitative differences in prediction these alternative explanations yield in a gift-exchange game. We estimate and compare leading approaches in these categories, using. experimental data. We then offer a flexible approach that nests the above t...
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作者：Morgan, J; Sefton, M
作者单位：Princeton University; Princeton University; University of Nottingham
摘要：We investigate behavior in two unprofitable games-where Maxmin strategies do not form a Nash equilibrium yet guarantee the same payoff as Nash equilibrium strategies-that vary in the riskiness of the Nash strategy. We find that arguments for the implausibility of Nash equilibrium are confirmed by our experiments; however, claims that this will lead to Maxmin play are not. Neither solution concept accounts for more than 53% of choices in either game. The results indicate that the tension betwee...
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作者：Gossner, O; Vieille, N
作者单位：Universite Paris Nanterre; Universite Catholique Louvain; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We characterize the max min of repeated zero-sum games in which player one plays in pure strategies conditional on the private observation of a fixed sequence of random variables. Meanwhile we introduce a definition of a strategic distance between probability measures, and relate it to the standard Kullback distance. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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作者：Duffy, J; Feltovich, N
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要：This paper reports results from an experiment designed to compare cheap talk and observation of past actions. We consider three games and explain why cheap talk or observation is likely to be more effective for achieving good outcomes in each game. We find that both cheap talk and observation make cooperation and coordination more likely and increase payoffs, relative to our control treatment. The relative success of cheap talk versus observation depends on the game, in accordance with our pre...
