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作者：Rustichini, A; Dickhaut, J; Ghirardato, P; Smith, K; Pardo, JV
作者单位：University of Turin; University of Turin; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Kansas State University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; US Department of Veterans Affairs; Veterans Health Administration (VHA); Minneapolis VA Health Care System
摘要：We study the behavior of subjects facing choices between certain, risky, and ambiguous lotteries. Subjects' choices are consistent with the economic theories modeling ambiguity aversion. Our results support the conjecture that subjects face choice tasks as an estimation of the value of the lotteries, and that the difficulty of the choice is an important explanatory variable (in addition to risk and ambiguity aversion). The brain imaging data suggest that such estimation is of an approximate na...
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作者：Samet, D
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作者：Yi, KO
作者单位：Sogang University
摘要：This paper investigates the implications of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) models [McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, Games Econ. Behav. 10, 6-38; 1998, Exper. Econ. 1, 9-41] in the ultimatum bargaining game. It is shown that, in a normal-form QRE (NQRE), each bargainer's decision depends critically on the anticipated behavior of the other, and there is a NQRE in which the proposer makes any offer between zero and equal split as a strict best response. The application of NQRE to the experimental ...
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作者：Bechara, A; Damasio, AR
作者单位：University of Iowa
摘要：Modem economic theory ignores the influence of emotions on decision-making. Emerging neuroscience evidence suggests that sound and rational decision making, in fact, depends on prior accurate emotional processing. The somatic marker hypothesis provides a systems-level neuroanatomical and cognitive framework for decision-making and its influence by emotion. The key idea of this hypothesis is that decision-making is a process that is influenced by marker signals that arise in bioregulatory proce...
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作者：Glimcher, PW; Dorris, MC; Bayer, HM
作者单位：New York University
摘要：Over the past half century economists have responded to the challenges of Allais [Econometrica (1953) 53], Ellsberg [Quart. J. Econ. (1961) 643] and others raised to neoclassicism either by bounding the reach of economic theory or by turning to descriptive approaches. While both of these strategies have been enormously fruitful, neither has provided a clear programmatic approach that aspires to a complete understanding of human decision making as did neoclassicism. There is, however, growing e...
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作者：Jackson, MO; van den Nouweland, A
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Oregon
摘要：We analyze the formation of networks among individuals. In particular, we examine the existence of networks that are stable against changes in links by any coalition of individuals. We show that to investigate the existence of such strongly stable networks one can restrict focus on a component-wise egalitarian allocation of value. We show that when such strongly stable networks exist they coincide with the set of efficient networks (those maximizing the total productive value). We show that th...
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作者：Blume, A; Arnold, T
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University Hohenheim
摘要：We study learning in communication games. Our main finding is that a simple forward-looking learning rule leads to communication in a large class of games. This class is characterized by a partial-common-interest condition. In contrast, we show that a variety of purely backward looking dynamics may fail to guarantee communication. Memory is a partial substitute for looking forward: With long memory, backward-looking learning leads to communication in a class of games with perfect incentive ali...
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作者：Dutta, B; Kar, A
作者单位：University of Warwick; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We propose a new cost allocation rule for minimum cost spanning tree games. The new rule is a core selection and also satisfies cost monotonicity. We also give characterisation theorems for the new rule as well as the much-studied Bird allocation. We show that the principal difference between these two rules is in terms of their consistency properties. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Heifetz, A; Segev, E
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：The experimental evidence on the endowment effect [Kahneman et al., J. Polit. Economy 98 (1990) 1325-1348] and the self serving bias in negotiations [Babcok and Loewenstein, J. Econ. Perspect. 11 (1997) 1337-1343] suggests that individuals enter a tough state of mind when they have to make a stand vis-a-vis somebody else. In this work we show how a toughness bias in bargaining may indeed be evolutionary viable. When the inherent toughness of the bargainer is observed by the opponent, this oppo...
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作者：O'Neill, B; Samet, D; Wiener, Z; Winter, E
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Tel Aviv University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Gradual bargaining is represented by an agenda: a family of increasing sets of joint utilities, parameterized by time. A solution for gradual bargaining specifies an agreement at each time. We axiomatize an ordinal solution, i.e., one that is covariant with order-preserving transformations of utility. It can be viewed as the limit of step-by-step bargaining in which the agreement of the last negotiation becomes the disagreement point for the next. The stepwise agreements may follow the Nash so...
