Bidding for the surplus:: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mutuswami, S; Pérez-Castrillo, D; Wettstein, D
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Essex; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.08.003
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 111-123
• 关键词: Implementation; Local public goods; Bidding; networks; Shapley value

摘要

In this paper, we consider a local public goods environment. The agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. We propose a bidding mechanism whereby agents bid for the right to decide upon the organization of the economic activity. The sub-game perfect equilibria of the mechanism generate efficient outcomes. We also show how to adapt the mechanism to network economies where the economic activity takes place via the formation of links. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.