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作者：Roughgarden, T; Tardos, É
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：Equilibria in noncooperative games are typically inefficient, as illustrated by the Prisoner's Dilemma. In this paper, we quantify this inefficiency by comparing the payoffs of equilibria to the payoffs of a best possible outcome. We study a nonatomic version of the congestion games defined by Rosenthal [Int. J. Game Theory 2 (1973) 65], and identify games in which equilibria are approximately optimal in the sense that no other outcome achieves a significantly larger total payoff to the player...
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作者：Cox, JC
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：This paper uses a three-games (or triadic) design to identify trusting and reciprocating behavior. A large literature on single-game trust and reciprocity experiments is based on the implicit assumption that subjects do not have altruistic or inequality-averse other-regarding preferences. Such experimental designs test compound hypotheses that include the hypothesis that other-regarding preferences do not affect behavior. In contrast, experiments with the triadic design do discriminate between...
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作者：Kirchkamp, O; Moldovanu, B
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Mannheim
摘要：We study experiments in an auction setting with interdependent valuation. Groups of three players receive private signals and then bid for a single, indivisible item. Valuations for the item differ within groups and depend asymmetrically on a bidder's own and other bidders' signals. Theoretically, the English auction yields efficient allocations, while other standard auction formats fail to do so. Consistent with equilibrium predictions, we find that an English auction yields significantly mor...
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作者：Kukushkin, NS
作者单位：Federal Research Center Computer Science & Control of RAS; Russian Academy of Sciences; Dorodnitsyn Computing Centre, RAS
摘要：If in a finite strategic game all strategies axe scalar, each player is only affected by the sum of the partners' choices, and one of three single crossing conditions is satisfied, then every best response improvement path leads to a Nash equilibrium. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Dubey, P; Haimanko, O
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：For extensive form games with perfect information, consider a learning process in which, at any iteration, each player unilaterally deviates to a best response to his current conjectures of others' strategies; and then updates his conjectures in accordance with the induced play of the game. We show that, for generic payoffs, the outcome of the game becomes stationary, and is consistent with Nash equilibrium. In general, if payoffs have ties or if players observe more of each others' strategies...
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作者：Muthoo, A
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：This paper studies the origins of one of the most basic of property rights, namely, the right of an individual or an organization to the fruits of its labour. My objective is to address the questions of why, when and how this property right can emerge and be made secure. I develop a model of the strategic interaction between two players in the state-of-nature, which is an environment characterized by the absence of any laws and institutions (including property rights and the state). My analysi...
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作者：Hernando-Veciana, A
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：This paper provides some striking results that arise in the unique symmetric equilibrium of common value multi-unit auctions in which some bidders have more information than others. We show that in a generalized second price auction with single-unit demand, bidders with less information do surprisingly well: they can have a greater probability of winning than bidders with mort information do, and may even have a higher expected utility. We also find a positive relationship between the success ...
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作者：Barua, R; Chakravarty, SR; Roy, S; Sarkar, P
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：A sensitivity index quantifies the degree of smoothness with which it responds to fluctuations in the wishes of the members of a voting body. This paper characterizes the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index using a set of independent axioms. Bounds on the index for a very general class of games are also derived. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Echenique, F
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has no cycles; and that all games with multiple equilibria have complementarities. As applications of my results, I show that: (1) generic 2 x 2 games either have no pure-strategy equilibria, or have complementarities; (2) generic two-player ...
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作者：Burton, A; Sefton, M
作者单位：University of Nottingham
摘要：We report an experiment with a 3 x 3 game with a unique and efficient equilibrium. However, each player's equilibrium strategy may result in a very low payoff if the other player does not use her equilibrium strategy. Players can avoid this possibility by playing an alternative safe strategy. When players have no opportunity for pre-play communication over 80% of subjects choose the safe strategy. However, we observe substantial increases in the amount of equilibrium play when (i) the riskines...
