Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Holzman, R; Kfir-Dahav, N; Monderer, D; Tennenholtz, M
署名单位：
Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00184-2
发表日期：
2004
页码：
104-123
关键词：
摘要：
This paper analyzes ex post equilibria in the VCG combinatorial auctions. If Sigma is a family of bundles of goods, the organizer may restrict the bundles on which the participants submit bids, and the bundles allocated to them, to be in Sigma. The Sigma-VCG combinatorial auctions obtained in this way are known to be truth-telling mechanisms. In contrast, this paper deals with non-restricted VCG auctions, in which the buyers choose strategies that involve bidding only on bundles in Sigma, and these strategies form an equilibrium. We fully characterize those Sigma that induce an equilibrium in every VCG auction, and we refer to the associated equilibrium as a bundling equilibrium. The main motivation for studying all these equilibria, and not just the domination equilibrium, is that they afford a reduction of the communication complexity. We analyze the tradeoff between communication complexity and economic efficiency of bundling equilibrium. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.