Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Spiegler, R
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00180-5
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 200-220
• 关键词: Nash equilibrium; complexity; justifiability; bargaining; delay

摘要

I explore the idea of simplicity as a belief-selection criterion in games. A pair of strategies in finite-automata representation (s(1), s(2)) is a Simple Nash Equilibrium (SINE) if: (1) s(j) is a best-reply to s(i); (2) every automaton for player j, which generates the same path as s(j) (given s(i)), has at least as many states as s(j). I apply SINE to a bilateral concession game and show that it captures an aspect of bargaining behavior: players employ delay tactics in order to justify their concessions. Delay tactics are mutually reinforcing, and this may prevent players from reaching an interior agreement. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.