Unique stability in simple coalition formation games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pápai, S
• 署名单位: University of Notre Dame
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.004
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 337-354
• 关键词: Coalition formation; matching; STABILITY; core; strategyproofness

摘要

We investigate the uniqueness of stable coalition structures in a simple coalition formation model, for which specific coalition formation games, such as the marriage and roommate models, are special cases that are obtained by restricting the coalitions that may form. The main result is a characterization of collections of permissible coalitions which ensure that there is a unique stable coalition structure in the corresponding coalition formation model. In particular, we show that only single-lapping coalition formation models have a unique stable coalition structure for each preference profile, where single-lapping means that two coalitions cannot have more than one member in common, and coalitions do not form cycles. We also give another characterization using a graph representation, explore the implications of our results for matching models, and examine the existence of strategy proof coalition formation rules. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.