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作者：Arrow, KJ
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：I give some personal reactions to the development of game theory as it found application in economic analysis during the last half-century. I discuss which contributions have in fact found use and, in particular, what was the role of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in light of previous and subsequent developments. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Núñez, M; Rafels, C
作者单位：University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona
摘要：A characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game is given in terms of the reduced marginal worth vectors. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his or her marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his or her predecessors. This set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is proved to be the set of extreme points of the core of the assign...
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作者：Asheim, GB; Dufwenberg, M
作者单位：University of Oslo; Stockholm University
摘要：The concept of 'fully permissible sets' is defined by an algorithm that eliminates strategy subsets. It is characterized as choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominates the latter on the set of all opponent strategies or on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. The concept refines the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and captures aspects of forward induction. (C...
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作者：Halpern, JY
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：I consider issues in distributed computation that should be of relevance to game theory. In particular, 1 focus on (a) representing knowledge and uncertainty, (b) dealing with failures, and (c) specification of mechanisms. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Durieu, J; Solal, P
作者单位：Universite Jean Monnet
摘要：We consider a 2 x 2 coordination game where each agent interacts with his neighbors on a ring. Ellison (1993, Econometrica 61, 1047-1071) shows that the discrete dynamical system generated by the myopic best-reply rule converges to a Nash equilibrium or to a two-period limit cycle. Following Young (1993, Econometrica. 61, 57-84), we consider a best-reply process with a sampling procedure. Particularly, we introduce a spatial sampling procedure: each agent observes a sample of information in hi...
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作者：Rath, KP; Zhao, GY
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; National University of Singapore
摘要：It is well known that in a duopoly model of product choice with quadratic transportation cost, the firms locate at the extreme endpoints of the market. Jehiel (1992, Int. J. Ind. Organ, 10, 633641) has examined this model in an infinite horizon setting where in the initial period the firms choose location and in subsequent periods charge the Nash bargaining solution prices. Then, in the unique equilibrium both firms locate at the center of the market. This paper examines the case when the firm...
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作者：Foster, DP; Young, HP
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Pennsylvania; The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：Consider a finite stage game G that is repeated infinitely often. At each time, the players have hypotheses about their opponents' repeated game strategies. They frequently test their hypotheses against the opponents' recent actions. When a hypothesis fails a test, a new one is adopted. Play is almost rational in the sense that, at each point in time, the players' strategies are epsilon-best replies to their beliefs. We show that, at least 1-epsilon of the time t these hypothesis testing strat...
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作者：Samuelson, L; Swinkels, JM
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We explore the interaction between evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences. To do so, we define a limit Nash equilibrium for a lexicographic game as the limit of Nash equilibria of nearby games with continuous preferences. Nash equilibria of lexicographic games are limit Nash equilibria, but not conversely. Modified evolutionarily stable strategies (Binmore and Samuelson, 1992. J. Econ. Theory 57, 278-305) are limit Nash equilibria. Modified evolutionary stability differs from lex...
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作者：Koller, D; Milch, B
作者单位：Stanford University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：The traditional representations of games using the extensive form or the strategic form obscure much of the structure of real-world games. In this paper, we propose a graphical representation for noncooperative games-multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs). The basic elements in the MAID representation are variables, allowing an explicit representation of dependence, or relevance, relationships among variables. We define a decision variable D' as strategically relevant to D if, to optimize the ...
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作者：Schmidt, D; Shupp, R; Walker, JM; Ostrom, E
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Ball State University; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：This paper presents results from a series of experiments designed to test the impact on subject behavior of changes in the risk dominance and payoff dominance characteristics of two player coordination games. The main finding is that changes in risk dominance significantly affect play of the subjects, whereas changes in the level of payoff dominance do not. Observed history of play also has an important influence on subject behavior, both when subjects are randomly rematched after each game an...
