Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schummer, J
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.08.002
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 154-170
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; almost dominant strategy; epsilon-dominant

摘要

We relax strategy-proofness (a form of dominant strategy implementation) by allowing small gains from manipulation. In 2-agent exchange economies, this relaxation is shown to have a discontinuous effect on the range of efficient rules, demonstrating a type of non-robustness in previous impossibility results. When gains are measured with respect to a single good and preferences are linear, we characterize a particular rule as being the most equitable among all efficient rules satisfying the relaxation. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.