Best response equivalence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Morris, S; Ui, T
• 署名单位: Yale University; Yokohama National University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.12.004
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 260-287
• 关键词: best response equivalence; Duality; Farkas' Lemma; potential games

摘要

Two games are best-response equivalent if they have the same best-response correspondence. We provide a characterization of when two games are best-response equivalent. The characterizations exploit a dual relationship between payoff differences and beliefs. Some potential game arguments [Games Econ. Behav. 14 (1996) 124] rely only on the property that potential games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games. Our results show that a large class of games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games, but are not potential games. Thus we show how some existing potential game arguments can be extended. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.