Non-excludable public good experiments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cason, TN; Saijo, T; Yamato, T; Yokotani, K
• 署名单位: University of Osaka; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.11.002
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 81-102
• 关键词: laboratory; fairness; Spite; social preferences; Voluntary contribution mechanism; Hawk-dove game

摘要

We conduct a two-stage game experiment with a non-excludable public good. In the first stage, two subjects choose simultaneously whether or not they commit to contributing nothing to provide a pure public good. In the second stage, knowing the other subject's commitment decision, subjects who did not commit in the first stage choose contributions to the public good. We found no support for the evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium, and the ratio of subjects who did not commit to contributing nothing increased as periods advanced; that is, the free-riding rate declined over time. Furthermore, this behavior did not arise due to altruism or kindness among subjects, but from spiteful behavior of subjects. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.