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作者：Yokoo, M; Sakurai, Y; Matsubara, S
作者单位：NTT, Inc
摘要：We examine the effect of false-name bids on combinatorial auction protocols. False-name bids are bids submitted by a single bidder using multiple identifiers such as multiple e-mail addresses. The obtained results are summarized as follows: (1) the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, which is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient when there exists no false-name bid, is not false-name-proof; (2) there exists no false-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol that satisfies Pareto efficiency; (...
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作者：Tennenholtz, M
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：In a computerized setting, players' strategies can be implemented by computer programs, to be executed on a shared computational devise. This situation becomes typical to new Internet economies, where agent technologies play a major role. This allows the definition of a program equilibrium. Following the fundamental ideas introduced by von Neumann in the 1940s (in parallel to his seminal contribution to game theory), a computer program can be used both as a set of instructions, as well as a fi...
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作者：Kibris, Ö
作者单位：Sabanci University
摘要：A bargaining rule is ordinally invariant if its solutions are independent of which utility functions are chosen to represent the agents' preferences. For two agents, only dictatorial bargaining rules satisfy this property (Shapley, L., La Decision: Agregation et Dynamique des Ordres de Preference, Editions du CNRS (1969) 25 1). For three agents, we construct a normalized subclass of problems through which an infinite variety of such rules can be defined. We then analyze the implications of var...
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作者：Amorós, P
作者单位：Universidad de Malaga
摘要：We study Nash implementation when the outcomes of the mechanism can be renegotiated among the agents but the planner does not know the renegotiation function that they will use. We characterize the social objectives that can be implemented in Nash equilibrium when the same mechanism must work for every admissible renegotiation function, and show the importance of allowing the planner to sometimes take away resources from the agents. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Çelen, B; Kariv, S
作者单位：New York University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We explore Bayes-rational sequential decision making in a game with pure information externalities, where each decision maker observes only her predecessor's binary action. Under perfect information the martingale property of the stochastic learning process is used to establish convergence of beliefs and actions. Under imperfect information, in contrast, beliefs and actions cycle forever. However, despite the stochastic instability, over time the private information is ignored and decision mak...
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作者：Echenique, F
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice-in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out-surpris...
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作者：Di Tillio, A
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Lehrer and Sorin (1997, Games Econ. Behav. 20, 131-148) use a one-shot public mediated talk model to show that, given any probability distribution on the outcomes of a finite normal-form game, there exists a public mediated talk mechanism that simulates that distribution, provided the probabilities on outcomes are rational numbers. It is shown here that a minor amendment of the very same model allows a much stronger conclusion: any distribution on the outcomes, whether the probabilities are ra...
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作者：Albizuri, MJ; Zarzuelo, JM
作者单位：University of Basque Country
摘要：In this paper we propose a characterization of the coalitional value for transferable utility games (Owen, 1977), and we define and study coalitional semivalues, which are generalizations of semivalues (Dubey, Neyman and Weber, 198 1). (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Stegeman, M; Rhode, P
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the stability of stochastic Darwinian dynamics in quadratic games. Each player's strategy adjusts through mutation and selection shocks, and stability is independent of the rates at which these shocks arrive. Given stability, we characterize the midpoint of the nondegenerate ergodic distribution. In small populations, some equilibria correspond to relative payoff maximization, but others are unanticipated by existing static concepts. In the ...
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作者：Diamantoudi, E; Miyagawa, E; Xue, LC
作者单位：Columbia University; Concordia University - Canada; McGill University
摘要：This paper studies whether a sequence of myopic blockings leads to a stable matching in the roommate problem. We prove that if a stable matching exists and preferences are strict, then for any unstable matching, there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic blockings leading to a stable matching. This implies that, starting from any unstable matching, the process of allowing a randomly chosen blocking pair to form converges to a stable matching with probability one. This result generaliz...
